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NOTES
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23: A
DEFENDANT CLASS ACTION WITH A PUBLIC
OFFICIAL AS THE NAMED REPRESENTATIVE
INTRODUCTION
A basic tenet of the Anglo-American jurisprudential tradition
has been that an adjudication on a particular issue affects and binds
only those individuals actually designated as parties to an action in
personam.1 For example, a decision of a particular court may deter-
mine the law or set the policy on a specific issue within its jurisdic-
tion. It does not, however, legally bind individuals within that juris-
diction who were not parties to or served with process in the original
adjudication. Nor does it have any effect on courts and individuals
in other jurisdictions except for possible precedential value.' Al-
though this system may be defended as one of the fundamental
concepts underpinning "due process,"3 it can present serious practi-
cal defects by creating divergent standards of conduct for the same
class of people. The incongruity of this system is most dramatically
illustrated when a statute or practice thereunder is challenged on
constitutional grounds. A finding by a federal district court that a
state statute is unconstitutional is not necessarily determinative of
1. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See E. B. Elliott Adv. Co. v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 425 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Harrison County, 399 F.2d 485 (5th
Cir. 1968); Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Everett, 340 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1965); Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Jasper, 144 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1944).
2.
Admittedly, the decisions of the courts of one system are not binding upon the
courts of another system, except insofar as the Constitution compels obedience, as it
does to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on federal matters, and
except to the extent that Erie-Thompkins requires the federal courts to follow state
law in non-federal matters. Thus while the decisions of one state may be persuasive
in another state, they are not binding precedents in the latter. But even in the same
court system, as in the federal, a decision is not binding upon a court of equal rank,
nor indeed upon a court of lower rank, unless the latter owes obedience to the higher
court. The duty of obedience, rather than rank, is the key.
1B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.402[1], at 61 (2d ed. 1974).
3. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See 1B
J. Moore, Federal Practice 0.411 (2d ed. 1974).
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its status as applied to other courts or parties within that state.' A
defendant class designating a public official as the named repre-
sentative offers an appropriate procedural device to alleviate many
of these defects. How this operates will be shown by the following
example.
There are approximately 1000 township trustees in Indiana.'
One of their duties is to distribute poor-relief assistance to indigents
within their townships.6 Ms. M. was denied such relief on the sole
basis that she did not meet the legal settlement requirement, a three
year residency in the state and a one year continuous residency in
the county.7 Ms. M. instituted an action in federal district court
attacking the constitutionality of this state durational residency
statute. She also requested a permanent injunction to prevent the
trustee from denying her relief. A three judge court granted the
4. A decision of one federal district court is not binding upon a different district court.
United States v. Mathis, 350 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1965); In re Bender Body Co., 47 F. Supp.
224 (N.D. Ohio 1942), aff'd on other grounds, 139 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1943) (S.D. Ohio decision
was not held to be binding in N.D. Ohio).
A decision from the same district may not even be later precedent for that district. In
Jackson v. Northwest Airlines, 75 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1947), modified on the merits, 185
F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 812 (1951), the district court refused to be
bound by a decision decided only three months previously by the same court though by a
different judge.
It has been held that a specially constituted three judge court is still a district court and
therefore may be bound by the court of appeals within that jurisdiction. See United States
v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Sunshine Anthracite
Coal v. Adkins, 31 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. Ark.), af'd, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
While a decision of a federal court, other than the United States Supreme Court, may
be persuasive in a state court on a federal matter, it is, however, not binding. State courts
only owe obedience to the United States Supreme Court. See United States ex rel. Lawrence
v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971); Owsley v. Peyton,
352 F.2d 804 (4th Cir. 1965); Brown v. Palmer Clay Proolucts Co., 290 Mass. 108, 195 N.E.
122 (1935), aff'd on the merits, 297 U.S. 227 (1936).
Likewise, a decision of a state court on a federal matter may be persuasive, but it is not
binding in the federal courts. See Kansas City Steel Co. v. Arkansas, 269 U.S. 148 (1925);
Marquardt Corp. v. Weber County, 360 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1966). See generally, 1B J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.402[1] (2d ed. 1974).
5. For a specific enumeration of each township within the State of Indiana, see IND.
CODE §§ 17-4-1-4 to 13 (1974).
6. h1D. CODE § 17-4-6-3 (1974). For an in-depth critique of the present township trustee
system and its numerous inadequacies, see Rosenberg, Overseeing the Poor: A Legal-
Administrative Analysis of the Indiana Township Assistance System, 6 IND. L. Rzv. 385
(1973).
7. IND. CODE § 12-2-1-5 (1973).
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injunction and declared the statute unconstitutional.8 Several
months later, Mr. D. applied for poor relief. He resided in a different
township within the jurisdiction of the same federal court., In disre-
gard of the judgment obtained by Ms. M., the trustee denied Mr.
D. assistance on the basis of the residency statute. Since the trustee
was not legally bound by the first adjudication on the issue, Mr. D.'s
only recourse was to instigate another suit to obtain an injunction
and bind the recalcitrant trustee. 0
In 1975, several years later, the statute still remains on the
books." It has been declared unconstitutional in only one of the
federal districts in Indiana. 2 Even within that jurisdiction, trustees
are still denying assistance to indigents on the basis of the residency
statute. Since township trustees are not responsible to one central
governmental official, a judgment against one is not enforceable
against another.13 As a result, only two trustees are legally enjoined
from enforcing the residency statute.
8. Major v. Van DeWalle, CCM Pov. L. REP. 10,934 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 10, 1969) (decla-
ration of invalidity), permanent injunction entered, CCH Pov. L. REF. 11,131 (N.D. Ind.
Mar. 2, 1970) (Civil No. 4169, South Bend Division).
9. Ms. M. resided in Portage Township, County of South Bend. Mr. D. resided in
Wayne Township, Allen County. Both townships are within the jurisdiction of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana.
10. Duckett v. Wayne Township and Robert D. Wass, Civil No. 69 F. 108 (N.D. Ind.
June 22, 1970). Plaintiff obtained a judgment on the pleadings on the basis of Major since
the case was before the same judges and within the same district. It should be noted, however,
that had the second suit been brought in the Southern District Court or in a state court, a
different result may have been reached; or at least plaintiff would be required to carry the
burden of demonstrating that the state durational residency statute was unconstitutional.
11. IND. CODE § 12-2-1-5 (1974). It is interesting to observe that the Major case is cited
after the statute in the Compiler's Notes.
12. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. See Major,
supra note 8 and Duckett, supra note 10.
13. The township trustee, as many other local officials, is the supreme administrator
of his designated domain. For instance, the township trustee is not subject to any review or
supervision concerning the township assistance program other than his township advisory
board [IND. CODE § 17-4-28 et seq. (1974)] and the state board of accounts [IN. CODE § 12-
2-1-30 (1973)]. The state board of account's only duty is to oversee and determinate whether
there has been a misappropriation of money. The board does not regulate or control the type,
standards or reasonableness of the relief distributed by the trustee. See Rosenberg, Oversee-
ing the Poor: A Legal-Administrative Analysis of the Indiana Township Assistance System,
6 IND. L. REv. 385, 391 (1973).
The independence of each township trustee is aptly demonstrated by the need in Duckett
to bring an entirely new suit to obtain an injunction against another trustee. This new suit
had to be filed irrespective of the fact that the legal issues presented were identical to that
et al.: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23: A Defendant Class Action wit
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The present status of the statute cannot accurately be predeter-
mined either in the state courts or in the other federal district court
within the state. Since federal courts sit only as additional trial
courts of the state, a state court is neither bound nor compelled to
follow its holding. 4 The possibility yet remains that a state court
may uphold the statute's constitutionality. However, the practical
effect of this legal chaos is even more serious and immediate. Indi-
gents in Indiana are placed in the anomalous position of having the
residency statute enforced against them in some townships, while
in others, the trustees are enjoined from enforcing it.
The typical remedy presently employed to prevent this uncon-
stitutional deprivation consists of instituting separate lawsuits
against each trustee still denying assistance on the basis of the
statute's durational residency requirement. This process, however,
could conceivably entail approximately 1000 suits. Also, the danger
exists that different courts may reach different results.'5 Common
in Major. This situation must be contrasted to that where one individual is in total command
of an entire governmental unit. Since all employees are subject to that authority, they are in
privity with and owe obedience to the head official. As a result, they may be bound by a single
adjudication naming only the department director. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
14. See note 4 supra.
15. This danger was recognized in Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14 (N.D. Ohio 1972), and
incorporated as one of the bases for maintaining a defendant class. The court noted that:
While it is highly probable that the same standards would be applied throughout
the course of separate proceedings, the risk remains that inconsistent adjudications
of the common issues would result. Thus, differing interpretations of the law could
guarantee recovery by the trustee in some cases, while denying it against other
defendants who are similarly situated. A clear purpose of Rule 23 is to avoid such
anomalous results.
Even if a class action is not employed, a judge in a later case may feel con-
strained by stare decisis to apply previously adopted rules to different defendants.
While this would eliminate the possibility of inconsistent adjudications, it becomes
clear that the first suit was dispositive of the class interests as a practical matter.
F.R.C.P. 23(b)(1)(B). Thus the requirements of Rule 23 should be utilized to assure
that the rights of the absent parties are adequately protected.
Id. at 17.
Although not directly on point, United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072
(7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971), does serve as a useful analogy in describing
the danger of inconsistent adjudications. In that case, petitioner brought a habeas corpus
proceeding to relieve his state court conviction for interfering with the duties of a police officer
in violation of a city ordinance. During the pendency of the petitioner's appeal to the Supreme
Court of Illinois, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in an unrelated
declaratory judgment action, held the city ordinance was prima facie unconstitutional. Sub-
sequently, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed petitioner's conviction, without referring
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1975], Art. 4
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sense dictates the availability of a more acceptable alternative. One
remedy, which would be more satisfying both to courts and all par-
ties involved, would be to formulate both a plaintiff class of all
indigents within the state denied assistance because of the dura-
tional residency statute and a defendant class of all township trust-
ees enforcing the statute.'" This procedure would offer several dis-
tinct practical advantages over the haphazard system now utilized.
First, a defendant class would serve the traditional purpose of
class actions - the avoidance of multiplicity of suits through the
elimination of repetitious litigation." Through economies of time,
effort and expense, judicial resources would be conserved. Also,
since the defendant officials would be sued as a class, the actual
presence of each official in the adjudication would no longer be
to the federal court's prior declaration of the ordinance's invalidity. The court of appeals
dismissed the writ of habeas corpus and held that the federal district court's prior declaration
that the ordinance was unconstitutional was not binding on the Supreme Court of Illinois.
16. In the type of suit envisioned by this note, there must be concurrently plaintiff and
defendant classes. There cannot be a suit with a single plaintiff (an indigent) against a
defendant class of township trustees because no privity exists between the single plaintiff and
the majority of the defendants. That is, the single plaintiff has not been personally injured
by the unnamed members of the defendant class. In Joseph v. House, 353 F. Supp. 367 (E.D.
Va. 1973), the court denied plaintiff's motion for a declaration of a class of defendants - all
cities in Virginia with similar ordinances.
Neither, in the absence of a proper defendant class, is there a proper plaintiff class.
The only persons, other than the named plaintiffs, who have a case or controversy
with the named defendants are other masseuses and massage parlor operators in Falls
Church and Norfolk.
Id. at 371. (emphasis supplied). See also Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass.
1972) (defendant class of all clerks in the state not allowed in the absence of a plaintiff class);
Fleetwood v. Thompson, 358 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (a single plaintiff was not permitted
to maintain a defendant class of all United States Attorneys for the failure to prosecute a
particular witness in a particular case).
This "mutuality" of parties can, however, pose interesting problems. For example, in
Koehler v. Ogilvie, 53 F.R.D. 98 (N.D. Ill. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 906 (1972), the American
Society of Divorced Men, Inc., brought an action constitutionally challenging certain of
Illinois' divorce laws. The purported plaintiff class consisted of all divorced men in Illinois.
The named defendants included the Governor, Attorney General of Illinois, and a defendant
class composed of all sheriffs and Circuit Court Clerks in the state. The district court aptly
observed that many of the defendants also fell into the proposed plaintiff class and in effect,
would be placed in the unusual position of suing themselves. Neither of the class actions were
permitted and the suit was otherwise dismissed under the doctrine of abstention.
17. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974); Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291, 297 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472, 484-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971).
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imperative.' Consequently, those officials absent would be freed
from constant litigation and allowed to discharge their normal du-
ties. This procedural device is particularly useful when the validity
of a statute is being challenged. The legal arguments presented in
each suit will be substantially the same; the factual variants of each
defendant official, if even relevant, would be at most minimal.' 9
This type of class action is a "natural class action, ' 2 since a later
adjudication would only substantially repeat that which the first
suit had already covered. These reasons alone would justify the
creation of a defendant class of public officials.
Furthermore, a defendant class would permit the individual
members of the class to join together counterclaims and defenses
thereby presenting their strongest case. Through Rule 24 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, absent members could intervene
in the suit. These members could add, strengthen and enrich all
available theories of the merits of the case which even the most
capable representative might disregard or overlook. Defendants
may also choose to pool their resources to hire competent attorneys
and staff, an opportunity which they may not have otherwise been
able to afford.2'
Another advantage of such a class action is that all of the public
officials would become parties, and hence become bound by a single
judgment.Y This would minimize the possibility of inconsistent ad-
18. The absence of individuals from the lawsuit for the sake of efficiency is, however,
precisely the same reason that a class action can be dangerous since the rights or duties of
those absentees are adjudicated in their absence.
19. When a statute or regulation ischallenged as being facially unconstitutional, the
legal issues will be identical for each member of the class. See notes 53 - 55 infra and
accompanying text.
20. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 H v. L. REv. 356, 387 (1967). In Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS
OF EQurrv 215 (1950), Dean Chafee remarked that "[a] class suit works best when the persons
are clothed in a sort of anonymity and lost in the crowd." This is precisely the case with a
defendant class of public officials when the constitutionality of a statute is being challenged
since "Ithe relief sought ...is really against the statute, not the defendants." Gibbs v.
Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
21. More likely than not, the state's attorney general will intervene and carry the
burden of defending the suit since the effect of the defendant class judgment will be state-
wide. See note 103 infra and accompanying text.
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3), provides:
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(1) or
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1975], Art. 4
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judications involving the same statute. Nothing could be more re-
pulsive to common sense and one's due process and equal protection
guarantees than having a statute declared void in one place, yet
valid in another. A single judgment binding all officials similarly
situated would also create for the first time a guarantee of a uniform
standard of conduct throughout an entire state. No longer would
injured parties constantly have to institute suits to bring an official
into line on a subject matter previously litigated.
Finally, a defendant class offers the plaintiff class a more mean-
ingful and substantial tool to obtain compliance against a recalci-
trant official who continues to impinge upon their constitutional
rights. Action against such an official would be easier because the
injured party could simply plead the class judgment as res judicata
since the defendant was a party to that action. 3 This dispenses with
the necessity of having to bring an entirely new action to relitigate
the merits. In addition, such an action carries more weight since
non-compliance by the defendant official could immediately result
in a contempt order against him. Although judges may be hesitant,
as a practical matter, to impose a contempt citation with
corresponding punishment against a fellow public official, the mere
(b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom
the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained
as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall
include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision
(c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds
to be members of the class.
23. The ease by which this enforcement mechanism can work (as opposed to re-
litigating the merits of an identical case which had already been fully explored) against a
member of a defendant class, is shown in the case of Research Corp. v. Edward J. Funk &
Sons Co., Inc., 15 FED. RuLz SEav. 2d 580 (N.D. Ind. 1971). The defendant in that case was
a member of the defendant class in an earlier adjudication, Research Corp. v. Pfister Asso-
ciated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. 111. 1969), appeal dismissed sub nom., Research
Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 497 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970). Because of defendant's refusal to
comply with the earlier court order, plaintiff brought an action seeking a declaration that the
earlier judgment was valid and binding upon the defendant. The court agreed and granted
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The court stated that two elements must appear
before an earlier class judgment is enforceable against an absent member. First, the defend-
ant must have been a member of the class represented in the class action, and second, due
process standards must have been met. Concerning the second requirement, the plaintiff is
benefited by a presumption that the first action was conducted in accordance with due
process standards. This places the burden on the party asserting a contrary position to raise
the issue and prove otherwise.
et al.: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23: A Defendant Class Action wit
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threat of contempt may provoke these officials to comply more read-
ily.
The purpose of this note is to explore the propriety and feasibil-
ity of defendant class actions with public officials as the named
representatives when a state statute or practices thereunder are
being constitutionally challenged. The examination will analyze the
prerequisites in creating a defendant class under Rule 23 and enu-
merate both the practical difficulties and unique characteristics of
a defendant class and demonstrate the difficulties imposed by the
Rule itself in the maintenance of such a class. It is hoped that this
note will offer new insights for individuals facing the problems that
are presently encountered in creating a defendant class and serve
as a working tool for attorneys and courts to avoid any pitfalls
confronted in the maintenance of a class of defendants. This note
will begin by examining those prerequisites which every class action
must meet.
RULE 23(a)
Rule 23(a) lists four prerequisites which every class action must
meet before it may be maintained. The four requirements include
the following: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality and
(4) adequacy of representation.
"Numerosity"
The first prerequisite to maintenance of a class action is that
"the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractic-
able."24 Impossibility of joinder is not required; it is sufficient to
demonstrate that it is extremely difficult or inconvenient to join all
members of the class.25 The class action device should not be uti-
lized unless joinder under Rules 19 and 20 is impracticable." This
24. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(1).
25. Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 56 F.R.D. 435, 439 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Wallace
v. Brewer, 315 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1970). 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.05, at
280 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as MooRE]; 7 C. WRIGHT & H. MIL.LER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1762, at 593-94 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]; Wright,
CLAss ACTIONS, 47 F.R.D. 169, 172 (1969).
26. Donelan, Prerequisites to a Class Action under New Rule 23, 10 B.C. IND. & COM.
L. REv. 527, 529 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Donelan]. But see Management Television Sys.,
Inc. v. National Football League, 52 F.R.D. 162, 164 (E.D. Pa. 1971):
There is no requirement that the members be too numerous to join individually, in
any event, an association of 26 football clubs is sufficiently large to warrant class
action treatment.
[Vol. 9
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requirement is simply to protect the members of a small class from
being unnecessarily deprived of their rights without a day in court.27
The plaintiff in both plaintiff and defendant class actions carries
the burden of showing impracticability of joinder as well as estab-
lishing the other requirements of Rule 23.8
The primary criterion in determining whether joinder is im-
practicable in plaintiff class actions has been the number of persons
in the proposed class.29 Numbers alone, however, have not provided
a suitable standard.3 Courts have been able to interpret "extremely
difficult or inconvenient" only in light of the particular circumstan-
27. Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Marston v. L.E. Gant,
Ltd., 56 F.R.D. 60, 61 (E.D. Va. 1972).
28. Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1366 (3d Cir. 1974); Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d
836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968); Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 51 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Parrish v.
Boetel & Co., 60 F.R.D. 680 (D. Neb. 1973). Professor Moore states that the generally ac-
cepted rule is that "[tihe burden is on the party, who seeks to utilize the class action, to
establish his right to do so." 3B MOORE 23.02-2, at 156.
In Joseph v. House, 353 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1973), the court denied plaintiffs' motion
for a defendant class of all Virginia municipalities which have ordinances against bisexual
massages. Since plaintiffs did not represent even an approximate number of cities which had
such ordinances, the court held that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of showing "numer-
osity."
In Mason v. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga.), modified on other grounds, 364 F. Supp.
452 (N.D. Ga. 1973), a defendant class of court marshals was denied because the plaintiff
failed to make the positive showing that the named marshals would fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the proposed defendant class pursuant to the requirements of Rule
23(a)(4). See Lopez Tijerina v. Henry, 48 F.R.D. 274 (D.N.M. 1969), appeal dismissed, 398
U.S. 922 (1970) (named defendant school board did not adequately represent the defendant
class).
29. See Donelan, supra note 26, at 530. This is also evidenced by the caption frequently
given Rule 23(a)(1), the "numerosity" requirement.
30. Cypress v. Newport News General & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n., 375 F.2d 648, 653
(4th Cir. 1967); Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 60 F.R.D. 359, 363 (W.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd
on other grounds, 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1974); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 56 F.R.D.
435, 439 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Marston v. L.E. Gant, Ltd., 56 F.R.D. 60, 61 (E.D. Va. 1972); Dale
Electronics, Inc. v. R. C. L. Electronics, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 534 (D.N.H. 1971); Roberson v.
Great American Insurance Companies of N.Y., 48 F.R.D. 404, 420 (N.D. Ga. 1969). The fact
that the absolute number of persons in a class is not controlling is shown by the case of Dolgow
v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 492 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d
Cir. 1970), in which it was stated that "the fact that plaintiffs cannot state the exact numbers
of people in the ... [plaintiff] class or identify them by name is irrelevant."
The inadequacy of numbers as the sole criterion is demonstrated by the inconsistent
decisions when the cases are examined and viewed solely from the perspective of the numbers
in each class. See cases cited in 3B MOORE 23.05, 272-73.
et al.: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23: A Defendant Class Action wit
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1975
366 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9
ces surrounding each case.' Such factors have included the nature
of the action, the type of relief requested and the geographic location
of the class.32 Where economic claims are involved and monetary
relief sought, courts have generally been strict in requiring a larger
number to form a plaintiff class.3 3 A more liberalized approach in
31.
But courts should not be so rigid as to depend upon mere numbers as a guideline on
practicability of joinder; a determination of practicability should depend upon all the
circumstances surrounding the case.
Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968). See Cypress v. Newport News General
& Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1967); Thomas v. Clark, 54 F.R.D.
245, 249 (D. Minn. 1971); Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd
without opinion, 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
32.
Yet other factors, [other than numbers alone] including the nature of the cause of
action, and the location of the members of the class, bear on the propriety of a class
action. Where the identity or location of many class members is unknown, and the
total membership in the group is indeterminable at the time of institution of the
action, a class action is appropriate.
Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (M.D. Ala. 1973). But see Samuel v. University of
Pittsburgh, 56 F.R.D. 435, 439 (W.D. Pa. 1972):
In this action, while the 48 proposed defendants are not particularly widely scat-
tered, and are readily identifiable, I think the inconvenience involved in joining them
serves to satisfy the numerosity requirement.
See generally 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1762; 3B MOORE 23.05; Donelan, supra note 26, at 531.
33. In patent infringement actions, a defendant class of 80, Technograph Printed Cir-
cuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. 111 1968), and one of 400,
Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1969), appeal
dismissed sub nom., Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 497 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970), were
held to be sufficiently large to meet the numerosity requirement. However, a class of 13,
Tracor v. Hewlet-Packard Co., 16 FED. RuLEs SEv. 2d 1475 (N.D. Ill. 1973), and one of 21,
Sperberg v. Firestone Tire, 61 F.R.D. 70 (N.D. Ohio 1973), were held to be far short of meeting
this requirement.
Likewise, in an action claiming a material omission of a prospectus, it was held that
joinder of 38 defendant-underwriters, all amenable to nationwide service of process, was not
impracticable. Guarantee Ins. Agcy. Co. v. Mid-Continental Rlty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555 (N.D.
Ill. 1972). An action against 86 federally chartered savings & loan associations (all in the
Chicago metropolitan area) on misrepresentation on the sale of savings accounts was also held
to be an insufficient number. Winokur v. Bell Fed. Say. & Loans Ass'n, 16 FEDS. RuLs SEiv.
2d 65 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
But see Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R. C. L. Electronics, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531 (D.N.H. 1971)
(defendant class of 13 patent infringers held sufficiently large to meet the requirement of
(a)(1)); Management Television Sys., Inc. v. National Football League, 52 F.R.D. 162 (E.D.
Pa. 1971) (action against an association of 26 football clubs sufficiently large to warrant class
action treatment). It should be noted, however, that in both of the latter cases, a judgment
was entered for the defendant class.
In this type of litigation, courts have generally required more proof by the moving party
than his mere belief that a certain number should be included in the class. The courts
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applying the requirements of Rule 23 has been adopted when civil
rights are involved.3
seemingly want more than mere speculation. See In re Yarn Processing Patent Litigation, 56
F.R.D. 648, 652 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (defendant class denied); Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data
Corp., 164 U.S.P.Q. 552, 553 (D. Md. 1970) (defendant class denied).
34. This liberalized approach is demonstrated by the fewer number of people required
by courts to maintain a class action. Twenty black teachers challenging discrimination in
salaries is sufficiently numerous. Arkansas Ed. Ass'n v. Board of Ed., Portland, Ark. Sch.
Dist., 446 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1971). Eighteen black physicians (including possible future
doctors who might be deferred from moving to the community) is sufficiently large enough
to constitute a class when challenging the discriminatory practices of a hospital only allowing
white physicians. Cypress v. Newport News General & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d
648 (4th Cir. 1967). Forty-one welfare recipients who had been denied certain benefits in the
previous years is impracticable of joinder. Chatman v. Barnes, 357 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Okla.
1973). A total of ten individuals convicted under the challenged criminal sexual psychopath
statute within the last two years is sufficiently large. Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320
(M.D. Ala. 1973). A class of thirty-eight people was sufficiently numerous to maintain a class
action in a suit by state prisoners challenging, on constitutional grounds, the conditions of
their incarceration. United States ex rel. Walker v. Mancusi, 338 F. Supp. 371 (W.D.N.Y.
1971), affd on other grounds, 467 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1972). A possible forty students denied
registration because of long hair is sufficiently large. Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 318
F. Supp. 529 (E.D. Texas 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973). All "members, friends and associates" of the Black Muslims who
operated a farm in one county are sufficiently numerous. Wallace v. Brewer, 315 F. Supp.
431 (M.D. Ala. 1970). A total of ten actual employees is sufficient in an employment discrimi-
nation suit. Local 246, Utility Worker's Union v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 13 FED. RuLES
SEV. 2d 479 (C.D. Cal. 1969). But see Holloway v. Parham, 15 FED. RuLES SEav. 2d 1390
(N.D. Ga. 1972) (welfare suit where the court held that without evidence to the contrary, the
number of members in the plaintiff class is speculative and at most twenty which was not
impractical). Perry v. Granada Separate School Dist., 300 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss. 1969)
(action by two.unwed mothers challenging a school regulation in denying admission could
not be maintained as a class action since there was no indication that there was a sufficient
number of unwed mothers in the school district). See generally 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1771.
This liberal approach in the civil rights areas has not been without criticism. In Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1969), the concurring judge
warned:
And, what may be most significant, an over-broad framing of the class may be so
unfair to the absent members as to approach, if not amount to deprivation of due
process. Envision the hypothetical attorney with a single client, filing a class action
to halt all racial discrimination in all the numerous plants and facilities of one of
America's mammoth corporations .... It is tidy, convenient for the court fearing a
flood of Title VII cases, and dandy for the employees if their champion wins. But
what of the catastrophic consequences if the plaintiff loses and carries the class down
with him, or proves only such limited facts that no practice or policy can be found,
leaving him afloat but sinking the class.
While this danger states a matter oftentimes overlooked by many courts, with all due defer-
ence, however, such a fear should not displace class actions in this field of litigation. On the
contrary, it should only reaffirm the courts' imperative and important duty to assure that
the named party adequately represents all members of the proposed class.
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Several reasons can be cited for this more permissive approach
with regard to civil rights. First, federal courts have a history of
being notably concerned when fundamental or constitutional rights
have allegedly been infringed. In such instances, they have typically
taken all necessary steps to remedy the injustice.3 5 A second, though
more pragmatic reason, is related to the type of relief usually re-
quested in such actions, i.e., injunctive or declaratory relief.
Whether the action proceeds as an individual suit or as a formal
class action, the requested relief will likely affect not only the
named parties but all persons similarly situated, irrespective of the
number of individuals in the class .3 This is particularly true when
the action seeks to strike down a constitutionally offensive statute.
Third, active participation by all class members as parties is less
necessary in actions requesting injunctive rather than monetary re-
lief.37 In the latter cases, individual suits may still be necessary to
determine and set damages for each plaintiff. Additionally, the legal
theory may vary with each individual member of the plaintiff class
depending upon the type or amount of claim involved. These factors
are not involved when an injunction is the primary relief sought.
This reasoning is equally applicable to a defendant class of
public officials. The few reported cases dealing with defendant
classes have taken the same approach as in plaintiff class suits; they
have not made a distinction between the two classes in this regard.
A smaller number is generally permitted in formulating a defendant
class in a civil rights action, 38 whereas a larger number is required
35.
The very nature of the Civil Rights Act contemplates the bringing of a class action
by even a small number of discriminated-against persons on behalf of all who are or
may in the future be similarly situated. Its purpose is to afford a broad remedy which
comes to the rescue of all persons fitting the class of plaintiffs.
Local 246, Utility Worker's Union v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 13 FED. RuLES SE V. 2d 479,
480 (C.D. Cal. 1969). For an example of the federal courts' active intervention to remedy the
deprivation of constitutional guarantees, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), and its aftermath.
36. Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
37. Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587, 592-93 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
38. In the following cases, a class of defendant public officials was permitted, each
meeting the numerosity requirement: Danforth v. Christian, 351 F. Supp. 287 (W.D. Mo.
1972) (all county and other election officials in the state); Samuels v. University of Pitts-
burgh, 56 F.R.D. 435 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (forty-eight from all the state universities in Pennsyl-
vania); Rakes v. Coleman, 318 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Va. 1970) (all judges empowered to commit
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in other areas, as in patent infringement suits."
"Commonality"'
The second prerequisite to maintenance of a class suit is the
presence of "questions of law or fact common to the class."4 Com-
mon questions need not encompass every claim or defense held by
each individual class member," nor need they predominate as re-
quired by subsection (b)(3), one of the four types of class actions.,2
persons pursuant to the state statute regarding alcoholics); Union Pac. R.R. v. Woodahl, 308
F. Supp. 1002 (D. Mont. 1970) (where the constitutionality of a state statute was being
challenged, it was held that joinder of all fifty-seven county attorneys of the state would be
a hardship and an inconvenience to all concerned); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327
(M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (all county sheriffs, wardens and jailors in
Alabama). But see Wallace v. Brewer, 315 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (the purported
defendant class of the Restore Integrity of Development Committee not allowed when the
uncontradicted evidence showed that only four members were in the organization).
It should be noted that under most circumstances with a defendant class of public
officials, Rule 23(a)(1) will not pose a major hurtle. As in the introductory example, when
the number gets as large as 1000, there will be little difficulty in proving and meeting the
numerosity requirement.
39. See note 33 supra.
40. FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(a)(2). It has been noted by several commentators that this
provision is redundant and therefore, perhaps superfluous. Implicit within any of the 23(b)
categories which every class action must fit, is the presence of common questions. In (b)(3),
they must "predominate." In subsection (b)(2), the grounds applicable to the class express
commonality. The two categories under (b)(1) both suggest a substantial overlap in either
common questions of law or fact. In view of this superfluity of (a)(2), these commentators
have attempted to explain courts' general avoidance or mere cursory treatment of (a)(2). See
3B MooRE 23.06-1, at 301; 7 WiuGHT & MMLUE § 1763, at 609-10. Likewise, in Vernon J.
Rockler & Co. v. Graphic Enterprises, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 335, 340 n.9 (D. Minn. 1971), the court
observed that:
[A]side from serving. the mechanical function of embodying the first chronological
step to be taken by the court, the express requirement of (a)(2) is arguably super-
fluous insofar as the existence of common questions is implicit in a finding that a
suit is definable as a (b)(1), (2), or (3) class action.
41. "Nothing in F.R.C.P. 23, however, mandates that the identity of the questions of
fact or law be total." Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 52 F.R.D. 510, 514 (W.D. Pa. 1971). See
Vernon J. Rockier & Co. v. Graphic Enterprises, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 335,.340 (D. Minn. 1971);
Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 213, 219 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 466 F.2d 1374
(10th Cir. 1972); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970).
If the facts or law substantially differ on a particular issue, subclasses may be formed or
the action limited to those issues in which commonality is present. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(4). See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 299 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
977 (1969); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
42. See note 112 infra and accompanying text.
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The rule only requires that there be some "common nucleus of oper-
ative fact" or law which would make the class action device a more
advantageous method of litigation." The benefits gained through
such a medium would be largely defeated should each member of
the class rely upon different facts or law."
When a statute or an administrative regulation is challenged as
being facially unconstitutional, the question of law will be common,
if not identical, to all members of the plaintiff class.45 Factual differ-
ences between members of the class, such as the reasons for which
a statute is brought into play, have not been held to be fatal. Rule
23(a)(2) only requires that there be common questions of law or
fact. " A sampling of the various statutes and regulations which have
formed a "common nucleus of law" for plaintiff class actions in-
cludes a claim and delivery statute,47 a sodomy statute," an involun-
tary confinement statute," a regulation pertaining to the reissuance
43. *Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 726-27 (N.D. Cal. 1967), petition
for writ of mandamus granted, 412 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1969). See Mersay v. First Republic
Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
44. See Donelan, supra note 26, at 532.
45. In Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 406
U.S. 913 (1972), the court maintained a plaintiff class action in setting aside convictions
under New York's Wayward Minor Statute. Regarding (a)(2), the court stated:
[S]ince we hold the provisions in question unconstitutional on their face, the ques-
tions of law and the claims presented are identical for all members of the [plaintiff]
class.
Id. at 374.
46. In Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1045 (1972),
the trial court refused to maintain a class of plaintiffs because the facts pertaining to the
delay in processing welfare applications varied with each case. The court of appeals reversed
stating that factual differences are not fatal if common questions of law exist. This legal
commonality was found in the interpretation and validity of state and federal statutes and
regulations. See Thomas v. Clark, 54 F.R.D. 245, 250 (D. Minn. 1971) (where there existed a
clear common question of law, however, the fact that the common question of fact was "not
quite so apparent" was not fatal). See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 300 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Vernon J. Rockler & Co. v. Graphic Enterprises, Inc., 52
F.R.D. 335, 340 (D. Minn. 1971); Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 213, 219 (D.
Colo. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 466 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1972); Siegel v. Chicken Delight,
Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 726-27 (N.D. Cal. 1967), petition for writ of mandamus granted, 412
F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1969).
47. Thomas v. Clark, 54 F.R.D. 245 (D. Minn. 1971).
48. Dawson v. Vance, 329 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Texas 1971).
49. Anderson v. Solomon, 315 F. Supp. 1192 (D. Md. 1970).
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of missing welfare checks, and a welfare regulation relating to the
time of first payment."
The same considerations are involved in a defendant class of
public officials. Such defendants are usually required to act pur-
suant to the challenged statute. Since their authority to act is com-
monly grounded in the same statute, the commonality of the legal
issues and defenses will be identical among all members of the
defendant class. As with the introductory example, the legal issues
and defenses regarding the validity of the state residency statute
will be identical for each of the approximately 1000 township trus-
tees.2 As previously discussed, 3 it is irrelevant to the predominate
issue of the case (the validity of the statute which grants public
officials the authority to act in a certain way) whether factual dif-
ferences exist between trustees, such as the size of the township,
budget, or that the reasons for triggering the statute into play dif-
fer." The validity of the statutory scheme and the power of the
50. Randle v. Swank, 53 F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Ill. 1971). In that case, the fact that the
amount of checks differed or that the reasons leading to the failure of the checks to arrive
differed was not controlling. Commonality of fact was found in the fact that the checks did
not arrive at all.
51. Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. 111. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 403
U.S. 901 (1971).
52. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
53. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
54. In Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968),
the named defendants asserted that there did not exist a common question of fact because
their physical facilities were more elaborate and their operations more complex than most of
the other jails within the state. In rejecting this contention, the court stated:
It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to find members of a class to serve
as representative defendants in a case, such as this one, where there are not some
material differences in the physical facilities and operations involved. But since the
rule requires only that there be questions of law and fact common to these defendants
and the members of the class which they represent ... then it becomes immaterial
whether certain of these class defendants are not otherwise identically situated.
Id. at 330. In Union Pac. R.R. v. Woodahl, 308 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Mont. 1970), plaintiffs
sought to have a certain statute pertaining to railroad procedures declared invalid. The
named defendants (a county attorney representing all of the county attorneys in Montana)
claimed that since the railroad was not even present in some counties, there existed no
common questions of law or fact to all county attorneys. In response, the court stated:
It cannot be said, however, that the county attorneys in counties which do not have
railroads have no interest in the constitutionality of the statute. There is the possibil-
ity, for example, that railroads may be constructed in the future in the few counties
which presently do not have railroads. The predominate question here is the author-
ity of all county attorneys to prosecute actions under the statute. In determining the
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defendant officials to enforce it will comprise not only the substance
of the litigation, but will equally provide legal commonality for both
the plaintiff and defendant classes.55
Interpretative problems of the commonality prerequisite have
arisen in suits which challenge either the constitutionality of a stat-
ute as applied or certain procedures practiced by defendant offi-
cials. In such cases, the commonality requirement is more difficult
to establish than when a statute is attacked on its face since the
factual differences and individual considerations play a greater role.
An example will further illustrate this point.
Imagine a class suit which challenges the improper administra-
tion of the defendant class of judges' discretionary power in deter-
mining bail or release on recognizance. Even though the defendant
judges would be judicially linked by obtaining their authority from
the same source, they would have little else in common. It is no
longer their authority per se which is being challenged but rather
their individual misuse of that authority. The nature of the offense
charged, numerous characteristics of the accused and the personal
views of each judge all play an integral role in determining the final
outcome of each case. In such cases, courts have been unanimous
in their rejection of a class action because of the want of commonal-
ity.
constitutionality of the statute, the court is not presented with the question of how
different county attorneys are affected. For purposes of a class action involving the
constitutionality of a statute and the power of defendants to prosecute actions under
it, the requirements of part (2) of Rule 23(a) are met if the authority to prosecute
actions under the statute is common to all defendants.
Id. at 1008. (emphasis supplied).
55. In Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 52 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the court held commonal-
ity existed because,
[t]he validity of the statutory scheme relating to the repossession of motor vehicles,
as it pertains to both classes [plaintiff and defendant], comprises the substance of
the action.... Likewise, whether some of the defendants are constitutional white
hats is irrelevant. The challenge to these statutes is geared at the permissive proce-
dures; therefore, it is facial. It is the same procedures that form the bond of legal
commonality between the plaintiffs and defendants.
56. The distinction between commonality when a statute is being facially challenged
and commonality when the validity of certain practices or a statute as applied is attacked,
is demonstrated in the case of Hamar Theatres, Inc. v. Cryan, 365 F. Supp. 1312 (D.N.J.
1973), prob. juris. noted, 94 S. Ct. 1967 (April 22, 1974). In that case, plaintiffs were permitted
to form a plaintiff class (all movie theatres in the state that exhibited "X"-rated and/or
[Vol. 9
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Two reasons can be suggested for this result. First, the practical
advantages of class suits, such as judicial economy, would be largely
defeated. Each judge would be compelled to intervene and demon-
strate that he did not abuse his discretion as to each individual
seeking bail. As one commentator observed, the case would become
a "procedural Tower of Babel."57 Secondly, and more fundamen-
tally, marked differences between members of the defendant class
would raise concern whether their due process rights would be guar-
anteed in a class suit. This alternatively would directly question
sexually oriented adult films) in their claim attacking the constitutionality of New Jersey's
anti-obscenity statute. However, plaintiffs were not permitted to form the same plaintiff class
in their action challenging the allegedly illegal search and seizure procedures practiced by
defendants. The court held that these procedures varied considerably in each case and there-
fore presented different factual and legal issues which would be resolved best on a case-by-
case basis.
Likewise, in Wilson v. Kelly, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd on other grounds, 393
U.S. 266 (1968), the court maintained a defendant class (159 sheriffs and 72 wardens) on the
issue of whether state statutes requiring segregation in prisons and jails were violative of the
fourteenth amendment. The court did not, however, permit the same defendant class to be
maintained regarding defendants' allegedly discriminatory hiring practices because of a want
of commonality. The court stated:
The hiring practices of each vary and have no connection with each other and they
are not responsible to different supervisors. A suit against one could no more bind
them all than an employment claim against one automobile dealor, one bakery, or
one business of any type could bind all other like businesses within the state.
Id. at 1010. A dissenting judge, in disagreeing with the majority on the issue of certification
of the respective plaintiff and defendant classes, stated in response:
I would permit plaintiffs to complete their statistical study, which, it seems, might
demonstrate the truth of their complaint that with some notable exceptions, defend-
ants operating institutions named in the [defendant] class action, are, in fact,
operating the entire system under their care solely by members of the white race ...
If the proof shows such facts, I am of the opinion that the plaintiffs would be entitled
to have this practice ended.
Id. at 1015. It should be noted that the major problem for the majority was plaintiffs' lack of
standing to assert the claim of discriminatory hiring practices since none of the named
plaintiffs had ever applied for such employment.
See Caldwell v. Craighead, 432 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953 (1971)
(defendant class of all public school band instructors, superintendents and high school princi-
pals could not be maintained for want of commonality); Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc.,
60 F.R.D. 359 (W.D.N.Y. 1972) (defendant class of N.F.L. football teams could not be main-
tained because the ticket practices of each club depended exclusively upon local factors such
as stadium seating capacity, fan interest, etc.); United States v. T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc., 335 F.
Supp. 246 (N.D. Texas 1971) (defendant class of 70 local unions regarding discrimination in
labor contracts could not be maintained because the contracts differed with each union, even
though the ultimate question of discrimination is the same).
57. Donelan, supra note 26, at 532.
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whether the named party official could adequately and fully repre-
sent all members of the defendant class.
If, however, the complaint were to allege that the practice of
judges in establishing bail for a criminal defendant is determined
solely on the basis of a set monetary schedule, an entirely different
question is presented. Each instance where bail is permitted would
now be factually common in one vital respect: the pervasive practice
by judges in setting bail exclusively by reference to bail bond sched-
ules .5 The question of law - whether such a practice is a constitu-
tional deprivation of an indigent's due process and equal protection
guarantees - would be shared by each defendant judge currently
employing the procedure. No longer would each judge be required
to intervene and defend his practice. Since there is now present a
"common course of conduct" among all judges, proof could be easily
supplied through the introduction of statistics."9 A judgment declar-
ing such a practice unconstitutional would require judges to ac-
knowledge other, less restrictive factors in establishing and adminis-
tering bail and influence the development of alternative standards
to implement such a program. 0
58. While it is true that judges in Indiana have the inherent power to reduce bail upon
a proper motion, or to release an accused on his own recognizance, the infrequency with which
these procedures are actually utilized should not detract from the pervasive practice by most
judges of using a set money schedule in setting bail.
59. Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 1964). In
Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 49 F.R.D. 184 (E.D. La. 1968), an employment discrimina-
tion suit, defendant objected to maintenance of a plaintiff class on the grounds that there
existed no commonality because each member of the class was factually different, as regards
to seniority, ability, job position, etc.. The court held that defendant misinterpreted the
thrust of the proposed class action.
The class action is not sought in order to bring in many factual grievences; rather, it
seeks to put the court in position to render a broad remedial order in the event that
the defendant has an established discriminatory policy or policies which operate as
to all Negroes, apart from and regardless of the individual circumstances of each.
Thus, the existence and operation of a pervasive policy affecting all Negroes is the
question of law or fact common to all members of the class.
49 F.R.D. at 187. (emphasis supplied). See Hecht v. Cooperative for Am. Relief Everywhere,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Martarcella v. Kelly, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Bishop v. Jelleff Associates, Inc., 16 FaD. RuLms SEnv. 2d 544 (D.D.C. 1972).
60. A judgment declaring such a practice unconstitutional would present some difficul-
ties in its enforcement. For instance, an individual unable to post bond may find it difficult
in establishing that the judge exclusively used the set schedule and did not adequately take
into account other, perhaps more relevant factors. The advantage of a class action of this
nature, assuming that the defendant can muster such evidence, is that it relieves the defend-
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The defendant class action offers plaintiffs an extremely impor-
tant procedural weapon in this field of litigation. The evidence in a
class suit may show a broad policy or pattern of discrimination or
constitutional deprivation practiced by public officials which insti-
tution of separate and individual suits might be unable to demon-
strate." Although this type of litigation puts a greater burden on the
moving party to prove commonality because of the greater factual
variants, plaintiffs should at least be given the opportunity. At pres-
ent, they have few other alternatives available to them to show such
a common and consistent pattern of behavior.
"Typicality"
The "claims or defenses of the representative parties must be
typical of the claims or defenses of the class" in order to satisfy the
third prerequisite to the maintenance of a class suit. 2 The precise
purpose and meaning of this requirement is obscure.13 Courts have
experienced difficulty in fully delineating the meaning of this prere-
quisite, as is reflected by their cursory conclusions, oftentimes with-
out explanation, that the representative's claims are typical to those
of the rest of the class. 4 Occasionally the defendant has conceded
ant from also having to prove the unconstitutionality of such a practice to that particular
judge.
61. In Bishop v. Jelleff Associates, Inc., 16 FED. RuLES SERv. 2d 544 (D.D.C. 1972), the
court maintained a plaintiff class in an employment suit alleging age discrimination. The
court found questions of fact common to all members of the plaintiff class on the issue of
whether defendants engaged in a pattern or policy of terminating workers in violation of the
law.
Although each plaintiff may have been terminated at a different time by a different
agent and allegedly for different reasons, the evidence as a whole may show a broad
policy of discrimination, which policy each plaintiff, suing alone, would be unable
to prove.
Id. at 545. (emphasis supplied).
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
63. White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo. 1971); State of Minnesota v.
U. S. Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968), vacated, 438 F.2d 1380 (8th Cir. 1971).
64. In La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221, 232 (N.D. Cal. 1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 890 (1972), aff'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), the court rejected
defendant's argument that the claims of the representative were not typical by stating "the
court disagrees" without further explanation. See Inmates of the Attica Correctional Facility
v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12, 24 (2d Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Walker v. Mancusi, 338
F. Supp. 311, 316 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 467 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1972); Moss
v. Lane Co., 50 F.R.D. 122, 126 (W.D. Va. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973); Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 318 F. Supp. 529, 534 (E.D.
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the point, and thereby relieved the court from further examination
of the matter. 5
The typicality requirement focuses on the representative and
his relationship to the other members of the class .6 The most preva-
lent test used in determining typicality has been whether there is
an absence of antagonism or conflict between the class members or
a showing that the claims of the representative are not inimical to
the interests of the other members of the class. 7 While this "lack of
adversity" approach permits flexibility because the claims need not
be factually identical among members of the class (it is only re-
quired that the claims or defenses do not conflict), 8 this test is also
used as one of the factors in determining whether the representative
will adequately represent the class. 9 It is understandable then that
Texas 1970), afl'd on other grounds, 470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986
(1973); Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Inv., 48 F.R.D. 7, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
65. Epstein v. Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 387, 390 (E.D. La. 1970); Zeigler v. Gibralter Life Ins.
Co., 43 F.R.D. 169, 172 (D.S.D. 1967).
66. Rule 23(a)(3) focuses on the consideration of whether the representative's interests
are truly aligned and consistent with the interests of the members of the class. One note writer
has suggested that the purpose of the typicality prerequisite is to help define the class. "The
precision in the definition of the class vis-a-vis the representative's status is the very essence
of the concept of typicality." Note, Class Actions: Defining the Typical And Representative
Plaintiff Under Subsections (a)(3) and (4) of Federal Rule 23, 53 B.U.L. REv. 406, 413 (1973).
See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HAav. L. Rv. 356, 387 n.120 (1967).
67. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12, 24 (2d Cir. 1971);
Schy v. Susquehanna Corp., 419 F.2d 1112, 1117 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970);
Pennsylvania Ass'n, Ret'd Child. v. Commonwealth of Pa., 343 F. Supp. 279, 293 (E.D. Pa.
1972); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 52 F.R.D. 510, 515 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Rakes v. Coleman,
318 F. Supp. 181, 190 (E.D. Va. 1970); Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099, 1113 (S.D. Texas
1970); Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
68.
Although there are varying fact patterns underlying each individual odd-lot transac-
tion, the same allegedly unlawful differential is charged to all buyers and sellers.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.
1973), vacated, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974). See Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 213,
219 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 466 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1972); Siegel v. Chicken
Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 726-27 (N.D. Cal. 1967), petition for writ of mandamus
granted, 412 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1969).
69.
[A]dequacy of representation requires that the interests of the representatives of the
class be compatible with and not antagonistic to the interests of those whom they
purport to represent.
Tijerina v. Henry, 398 U.S. 922 n.2 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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several courts have treated the typicality requirement simply as an
overlap of the requirement found in (a)(4), that the named party
adequately represent the class.y0
Another test in determining typicality has been that the repre-
sentative's claim for relief is grounded on the same legal or remedial
theory as the rest of the class.7' This approach is related to and in
effect simply restates the "commonality" prerequisite previously
examined.72
The confusion surrounding the "typicality" requirement has
led respected commentators to divergent conclusions. Professor
Moore has urged that there is no need for the clause "since all
meaning attributable to it duplicate requirements prescribed by
other provisions in Rule 23. ",13 This is demonstrated by the duplica-
tion of the "commonality" and "adequacy of representation" prere-
quisites. Professors Wright and Miller have stated that
Rule 23(a)(3) may have independent significance if it is
used to screen out class actions when the legal or factual
position of the representatives is markedly different from
that of other members of the class even though common
issues of law and fact are raised.74
Whatever approach or conclusion is used by a particular court,
the typicality requirement will raise the same questions and present
the same problems for a defendant class as discussed earlier in the
commonality section.75 When a statute is being challenged on its
face, the affinity among the members of the defendant class of pub-
70. Koehler v. Ogilvie, 53 F.R.D. 98, 100 (N.D. Ill. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 906 (1972);
Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The court in
Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173, 1193 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 437 F.2d 619
(2d Cir. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 991 (1971), stated that the typicality requirement was "designed
to buttress the fair representation requirements in Rule 23 (a)(4)." This confusion with (a)(4)
may be due to the fact that both requirements come from the same source. See Donelan,
supra note 26, at 534-35; Note, Class Actions: Defining the Typical and Representative
Plaintiff Under Subsections (a)(3) and (4) of Federal Rule 23, 53 B.U.L. REV. 406, 409 (1973).
71. Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 71 n.7 (5th Cir. 1973).
72. Rakes v. Coleman, 318 F. Supp. 181, 191 (E.D. Va. 1970); Gerstle v. Continental
Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 213, 219 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 466 F.2d 1374 (10th
Cir. 1972); Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Inv., 48 F.R.D. 7, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
73. 3B MooRE 23.06-2, at 325.
74. 7 WRIGHT & MILLE § 1764, at 614.
75. See page 369 supra.
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lic officials will probably be so strong that their defenses will be
identical with each other. This is true because the class is being sued
on their authority and not as individuals per se. Where certain
procedures practiced by officials are being attacked, the moving
party will again face the same difficulties in establishing typicality
as commonality because of the greater role that factual differences
and individual considerations play.7"
"Adequacy of representation"
The fourth prerequisite to maintenance of a class action de-
mands that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class."" This requirement has always
been a major consideration in the formation of representative suits. s
Its fundamentality has become even greater because of the ex-
panded binding effect of class actions since the 1966 amendment to
Rule 23.11 Where one or several members of a class are asserting or
defending the interests of individuals not before the court, and those
absent individuals may be bound by the adjudication, the adequacy
of the representation becomes essential. Its importance arises not
only out of general considerations of fairness (because such individ-
uals are deprived of the long-favored policy that each person is
entitled to his day in court), but more seriously, those absent mem-
bers who may be bound are constitutionally guaranteed due process
76. See notes 52-61 supra and accompanying text.
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
78. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
79. The 1966 amendment to Rule 23 eliminated the old "spurious" class suit, which was
"little more than a permissive joinder device," Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 493 (E.D.
N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970), and in which judgments were
binding only upon class members who "opted in." See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d
555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 94 S.
Ct. 2140 (1974); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 727 (N.D. Cal. 1967),
petition for writ of mandamus granted, 412 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1969). Since the 1966 amend-
ment, all members of a (b)(1) and (b)(2) class action are bound as are all members of a (b)(3)
class action who fail to request exclusion from the class. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3); Research
Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059, 1060 (7th Cir. 1970).
Adequacy of representation becomes particularly important for members of a class main-
tained under (b)(1) or (b)(2). Such members do not have the privilege of opting out of the
suit that is accorded to class members of a (b)(3) suit. See notes 117-18 infra and accompany-
ing text. Also, the mandatory notice requirements of 23(c)(2) do not apply; notice is rather
discretionary with the court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2). As a result of these distinctions,
class members in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions must necessarily rely on their representative to
protect their interests.
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1975], Art. 4
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of law." It is generally agreed that this factor becomes even more
crucial when a judgment is sought against a class of defendants.81
The major requirement for establishing this prerequisite has
been that the named representative will vigorously and uncom-
promisingly protect the interests of the entire class."' In short, the
court must be assured that "the representative [will] put up a real
fight.""' Courts and commentators have interpreted this to mean
that the named representative must have a substantial desire to
pursue the claim and obtain the appropriate relief."' Desire is
usually manifested by the representative's personal stake in the
outcome. It is contended that the greater the personal stake in the
outcome, the more likely the representative will put up a "real
80. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Thus, an absent class member who can
demonstrate that the representative has failed to fully and vigorously represent his (the
absentee's) interests, will not be bound by the class judgment. Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d
67 (5th Cir. 1973).
81. Marston v. L. E. Gant, Ltd., 56 F.R.D. 60, 62 (E.D. Va. 1972); C. WmGHr, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 72, at 308 & notes 23-24 (2d ed. 1970). But see 7 WmGHT & MILLER §1770,
at 658-59, where this distinction between plaintiff and defendant classes is discounted be-
cause of the lack of abuse shown in the reported cases and the courts' obligation and demon-
strated willingness to carefully consider the adequacy of representation.
82.
[Tihe primary criterion is the forthrightness and vigor with which the representative
party can be expected to assert and defend the interests of the members of the class,
so as to insure them due process.
Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See Gonzales
v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 75 (5th Cir. 1973); Hohman v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711,
714 (7th Cir. 1968); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 52 F.R.D. 510, 515-16 (W.D. Pa. 1971);
Feder v. Harrington, 52 F.R.D. 178, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Epstein v. Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 387,
392 (E.D. La. 1970); Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dolgow v. Ander-
son, 43 F.R.D. 472, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970);
Note, The Class Representative: The Problem of the Absent Plaintiffs, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1133
(1974); Note, The Vigorous Prosecution Requirement: Initial Determination and Retrospec-
tive Evaluation, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1156 (1974).
83. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds,
438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970), quoting, Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF Equrry 231 (1950). Accord,
Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
84. In Hodgson v. Hamilton Municipal Court, 16 FED. RuLES SEv. 2d 550 (S.D. Ohio
1971), plaintiff sought to enjoin a class of state court judges and clerks from continued
adherence to the state statutory garnishment standards which had allegedly been preempted
by the restrictions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. One of the named defendants took
no adversary position; another, the court noted, was "exceedingly zealous and obviously
sincerely involved." In rejecting plaintiffs motion for maintenance of the defendant class, the
court stated, "[in our view, neither a nonadversary nor one who is too zealous can provide
such 'adequate' representation." Id. at 552.
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fight." If the representative puts up such a fight, then it is presumed
that the absent members' interests are adequately protected.
8 5
This test of the representative's personal stake in the outcome
has little applicablity in the context of defendant class actions. A
single defendant has nothing to gain by being named a representa-
tive of a class. A class suit could become both procedurally and
substantively more complex than an individual suit. The named
representative could be taxed with increased costs for such a suit
without guarantee that he will be reimbursed for his efforts by the
absent class members." The named representative only faces
greater responsibilities and burdens without obtaining any tangible
benefits. Most annoying is the fact that the named representative
is confronted with these extra obligations without his own consent.
The representative's personal motivation to be the representa-
tive of a class should not play more than a nominal role in a defen-
dant class action. Otherwise, every possible representative would
claim a lack of desire to be the named party. 8 This, like the "opt-
85. The representative's personal stake in the outcome is usually determined by the
degree of his economic interest in the matter. See Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Inv., 48
F.R.D. 7, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1969). However, in small claimant plaintiff class actions, it is often-
times the representative's attorney who holds the real stake in the outcome rather than the
individual members of the class. Wolfson v. Solomon, 54 F.R.D. 584, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
quoting, Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1943), "[in many cases such
as this the possibility of recovering fees will provide the sole stimulus for the enforcement of
class rights." See Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dolgow v. Anderson,
43 F.R.D. 472, 494-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970).
Even in class actions where only injunctive relief is sought, courts have found incentive
to prosecute. One court has held that welfare recipients attacking the validity of a welfare
regulation "have a sufficiently large economic stake in the proceedings to insure diligent and
thorough prosecution of the litigation." Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289, 294 (N.D. Ill.
1970), afj'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 90 (1971).
86. Not only will the fees for the representative's attorneys be substantially increased,
but these additional fees for the representative's attorneys' greater procedural involvement
may well be unnecessary to the representative's immediate and personal interests.
87. See Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill.
1969), appeal dismissed sub nom., Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059 (7th
Cir. 1970). In that case, the court held that where one of the world's largest agricultural
commodities companies was the named defendant representative, the factor of desire as
opposed to ability, "should not be given more than token weight." 301 F. Supp. at 499.
In one of the first cases to consider a defendant class action under amended Rule 23, the
court in dictum expressed "serious misgivings" as to the standing of the named representative
to raise the issue of adequacy of representation. The court believed that such a defense would
enure only to the benefit of the members of the class that the named defendants were
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1975], Art. 4
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out" provision in (b)(3), would practically render meaningless any
defendant class action.8s Motivation becomes even less of a factor
when the named representative is a public official. Such an official
has a legal obligation to defend the state's position. In contrast to a
typical defendant who may hold a personal desire to avoid an
adverse monetary judgment, a public official usually has nothing
personally to lose. Such actions are against, in reality, the state or
its statutory scheme and not the individual officials per se.89 If de-
sire, then, is not a crucial factor in defending individual actions,
there is no apparent reason to require it when the official is named
as a representative of a class. 0 This is particularly true when the
constitutionality of a statute is being challenged since the work load
in defending such an attack will not be that much greater than if
allegedly representing. Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 330 n.3 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd,
390 U.S. 333 (1968). This proposition has been rejected by other courts on the basic premise
that an obligation is imposed on the named defendants to assume the defense, not only for
itself, but of all other absent defendants. Also, courts generally recognize that this obligation
may result in a tremendous increase in the cost to the named defendants without any com-
mensurate benefit. See Winokur v. Bell Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 16 FED. RULES SEnv. 2d 65,
69 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
The vigorous opposition by the named defendant representative to the formation of a
defendant class and his status as the representative, can be a good trial tactic because it
brings to the attention of the court the numerous problems which face a named defendant
representative. For example, in Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 57 F.R.D. 177,
180 (N.D. Ga. 1972), the court held, after observing the named defendant's vigorous opposi-
tion, that:
(allthough the court has concluded that a class action may be maintained, it sees
no reason to make Mrs. McDaniel the named defendant representative bear the
burdens of managing it, especially since plaintiff, rather than Mrs. McDaniel, stands
to benefit from this form of action.
88. See notes 117-21 infra and accompanying text.
89. This is not to say that a public official does not care about the adjudication, and
as a result, will be a poor defendant for the state in protecting its interests. First, the official
may be personally liable for failure to comply with a court order in a contempt proceeding.
Second, acknowledgment of this proposition would mean that one could never sue a public
official, or at least without a determination by the court that the official "cares" enough. This
is, however, completely untenable. Finally, these factors give even more weight to the argu-
ment favoring a defendant class action with public officials since other officials who are not
so reluctant or lethargic can intervene as party members, thereby perhaps providing a better
defense.
90. But see Rakes v. Coleman, 318 F. Supp. 181, 190 (E.D. Va. 1970), where one of the
cited reasons for maintenance of a defendant class of state court judges was named defendant
judge's failure to object to his representative status.
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the suit were an individual, non-class action." In sum, personal
motivation to be the named party should be immaterial.
Another problem of adequate representation in a defendant
class action is that it is the plaintiff who initially appoints the
representative for the defendant class." The obvious fear is that the
plaintiff will choose an adversary whose defense will be less than
zealous 93 or possibly non-existent. 4 It has been aptly observed that
"[iut is a strange situation where one side picks out the generals
for the enemy's army."9 5 For instance, in patent infringement cases
(which have made frequent use of defendant classes), the plaintiff,
patent holder, can choose from any one of the numerous infringers."
91.
The lawyer's task with respect to common questions of law and fact is not more
difficult whether he is representing one person or a class of a million. In either case,
he will have to prove the same allegations if he is to prevail.
Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 473 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d
825 (2d Cir. 1970). In fact, the named representative of a defendant class of public officials
may have less of a work load than had he had to defend the suit alone. The named defendant
may receive aid in defending the class suit either through the intervention of other members
of his class or through the intervention of the state's attorney general.
92. Defendant class actions are actually procedural weapons for plaintiffs since it is the
plaintiff who usually makes the motion for a defendant class. See note 28 supra. Occasionally,
however, the defendants themselves may desire to form their own class. In Gonzales v.
Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973) (action by parents of black
children denied admission to privately supported schools), the Southern Independent School
Association intervened as a party-defendant, asserting that it represented non-profit, private
white schools in seven states and the class of all similarly situated schools and their associated
parents and students. The court, without explanation, denied both motions for a plaintiff and
defendant class.
Also, it may be the court which, upon its own initiation, may formulate a defendant class.
See Danforth v. Christian, 351 F. Supp. 287 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
93. The danger is illustrated by a well-known state case in which the entire class of
defendants was held bound by an action against carefully choosen class representatives with
a very small financial interest and who made only a token defense. Richardson v. Kelly, 144
Tex. 497, 191 S.W.2d 857 (1945), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 798 (1956), noted in, Z. CHAFFE, SOME
PROBLEMS OF Equrry 239 et seq. (1950); Note, Due Process Requirements of a State Class
Action, 55 YALE L.J. 831 (1946); and Comment, Denial of Due Process Through Use of the
Class Action, 25 TEXAS L. Rsv. 64 (1946).
94. Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199, 107 Cal. Rptr. 137, 507 P.2d 1345 (1973), rev'd
sub nom., Richardson v. Ramirez, 94 S. Ct. 2655 (1974), where the original three named
defendant representatives (county clerks) defaulted and gave the court notice that they would
not contest the action.
95. Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQuTY 237 (1950).
96. See Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R. C. L. Electronics, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531 (D.N.H. 1971);
Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1969), appeal
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The plaintiff can choose the infringer with the most limited re-
sources or choose the one least likely to defend and contest the
action. Even if the plaintiff has the most laudable of intentions,
there is no assurance that the named party defendant whom he
chooses will meet with the general approval of the members of the
defendant class or truly represent the class. 7
The fear of collusive suits in defendant class actions is not as
legitimate when the defendant is a public official. In contrast to the
patent infringement area, the named plaintiff representative can
only name that defendant official by whom he has been personally
injured. He does not have the freedom to pick and choose an official
similarly situated with whom he is not in privity. If the named party
official is incompetent as a represenative of the defendant class, it
dismissed sub nom., Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970);
Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill.
1968). But see In re Yarn Processing Patent Litigation, 56 F.R.D. 648 (S.D. Fla. 1972);
Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 164 U.S.P.Q. 552 (D. Md. 1970); Note, Class Actions
in Patent Suits: An Improper Method of Litigating Patents?, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 474 (1971).
97. Because of the unique characteristics of defendant classes, the usual attitudes con-
cerning an adversary proceeding are somewhat inappropriate. Dean Chafee in this regard, has
aptly observed:
[S]uch considerations throw an especial responsibility upon the court when a class
of defendants is sued. The judge ought to realize that he can not accept the plaintiff's
choice of the representatives as final, anymore than he would allow a plaintiff to
choose the defendant's lawyer. Consequently, the court ought to scrutinize the se-
lected representatives of the defendant class with the greatest care and arrange for
changes and additions if there is the slightest reason to suspect incompetence or the
absence of the will to fight. The judge ought to regard the unnamed members of the
sued class as wards of the court for the time being, and assume the same sort of
responsibility in making sure that their interests are properly safeguarded as when
he chooses a receiver or a trustee in bankruptcy. He knows that the nominees of
creditors are not always ideal persons to operate or liquidate a business. He ought to
be just as wide awake to the fact that the nominees of plaintiffs are not always ideal
persons to conduct the defense of an equity suit.
Z. CHAPE, SoME PROBLEMS oF EQurry 238 (1950). He ends his observation by warning that
"[ulnless the judge looks after the unnamed persons, nobody looks after them." Id. at 242.
These extra responsibilities facing the court mandate the utilization of new and alterna-
tive remedies to protect the absent members. One such option would be to appoint indepen-
dent counsel to represent the defendant class other than the named defendants. See Appleton
Electric Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1974). The court can also
issue notice pursuant to.FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(d)(2), to ensure that the named defendant is an
adequate representative. Notice also gives assurance to the court that its decision will not be
later collaterally attacked on due process grounds because of inadequate representation. See
notes 218-21 infra and accompanying text.
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is as a result of geographic location, not by a deliberate or inadvert-
ent choice of the plaintiff."
The inherent difficulties with using incentive as a factor in
determining adequacy of representation in defendant class actions
and the fear of collusive suits led one court to instead formulate two
requirements: that the named representative have the intention to
defend and that he have the ability to do so." Courts have found
that the ability of the named party is best reflected by the quality
and caliber of the attorney representing the class.'"0 Although courts
have not been uniform in their method of determining compe-
98. This may be of little comfort to the absent members of the defendant class. More
importantly, it should not induce courts to relinquish their duty to independently scrutinize
the named defendant's capacity to fully and fairly represent all members of the class.
99. Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497, 499 (N.D. Ill.
1969), appeal dismissed sub nom., Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059 (7th
Cir. 1970).
100. Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir. 1973); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968), rev 'd on other grounds, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated,
94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974); Management Television Sys., Inc. v. National Football League, 52
F.R.D. 162, 164 (E.D. Pa. 1971). It should be noted, however, that nowhere in Rule 23 is the
matter of competency of counsel enumerated. The requirement appears to have originated
in Eisen. See Note, The Class Representative: The Problem of the Absent Plaintiffs, 68 Nw.
U.L. REv. 1133, 1136 n.31 (1974).
The rationale underlying the importance of the representative's counsel was examined
in La Mar v. H. & B. Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973), when the court stated:
The fourth prerequisite is that "the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class." This is particularly troublesome in class
actions, such as these, in which the injury to any possible representative party is
quite small. Either no one of the injured class is a suitable representative or anyone
is. From this it may be said to follow that each possible representative party could
"fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."
The difficulty with this position is that compliance with the prerequisite must
necessarily be determined more by examination of the fitness of the counsel of the
candidate for the representative party status than by the attributes of the candidate.
Once the ability of counsel becomes the measure by which compliance with the
fourth prerequisite is determined, there remains only a formal and technical reason
for insisting that there be a representative party at all.
489 F.2d at 465-66. The relative importance of counsel and corresponding unimportance of
the named class representative is reflected by the willingness of courts to allow a class action
to continue despite the fact that the representative's claim has become moot. See Wymelem-
berg v. Syman, 54 F.R.D. 198, 200 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (plaintiff representative died, held not
moot); Thomas v. Clarke, 54 F.R.D. 245, 252 (D. Minn. 1971) (plaintiff representative re-
gained possession of his automobile, held not moot); Note, Does Mooting of the Named
Plaintiff Moot a Class Suit Commenced Pusuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 8 VAL. U.L. REv. 333 (1974).
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tency,'1' the foremost criterion has been that the attorney be experi-
enced and generally be able to conduct the particular type of litiga-
tion involved. 02
Competency of counsel will usually not present a major stum-
bling block when the defendants are a class of public officials. Many
states have statutes which permit the state's attorney general to
intervene when injunctive relief is sought against a public official
or the validity of a statute is being constitutionally challenged. 0 3
101. Several courts have looked at the quality of the attorney's work, such as discovery,
techniques, arguments and briefs. If all the relevant theories to protect the class' interests
were sufficiently covered to the court's satisfaction, there then existed a vigorous prosecution.
Northern Natural Gas v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 635 (D. Kan. 1968), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 951, reh. denied, 404 U.S. 1065, modified on other grounds, 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1971).
See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 52 F.R.D. 510, 516 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Epstein v. Weiss, 50
F.R.D. 387, 392 (E.D. La. 1970); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1968),
rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970).
One court recognized that the firm of the representative's attorney was "one of high
standing." Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R. C. L. Electronics, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 536 (D.N.H.
1971). In Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099, 1114 (S.D. Texas 1970), counsel for the
plaintiff class were praised for belonging to the second oldest law firm in Houston and for
the quality of their previous work before the same court. The same court also observed that
the attorneys were "men of integrity . . . of determination and are in excellent health."
Accord, Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714,
721 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (counsel had the "means, skill and integrity" to prosecute the defendant
class action).
102. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974); Williams v. Local 19,
Sheet Metal Wkrs, 59 F.R.D. 49, 55 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 56
F.R.D. 435, 439 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Wolfson v. Soloman, 54 F.R.D. 584, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Management Television Sys., Inc. v. National Football League, 52 F.R.D. 162, 164 (E.D. Pa.
1971); Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099, 1114 (S.D. Texas 1970); Berland v. Mack, 48
F.R.D. 121, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43
F.R.D. 452, 457 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
Courts are generally reluctant to rule on the sensitive issue of whether an attorney is
competent. Frequently, it is only given a cursory treatment. See, e.g., Katz v. Carte Blanche
Corp., 52 F.R.D. 510, 516 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Comment, Class Actions: Defining the Typical
and Representative Plaintiff under Subsections (a)(3) and (4) of Federal Rule 23, 53 B.U.L.
REv. 406, 410 n.35 (1973). At least as regards plaintiff classes, courts often presume that the
attorneys for the named representatives are qualified and competent. Dolgow v. Anderson,
43 F.R.D. 472, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970). This
presumption and cursory treatment is shown by the want of reported cases which hold that
the attorney for the representative is unqualified and therefore a class action cannot be
maintained. See Anderson v. Moorer, 372 F.2d 747, 751 n.5 (5th Cir. 1967); Shields v. Valley
Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448, 449 (D. Ariz. 1971).
103. E.g., IND. CODE §§ 4-6-2-1 to -1.5 (1974); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 71 (McKinney 1972);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 165.25 (1974). Also, the state's attorney general may be named as an
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Practically speaking, the state's attorney general will frequently
carry the major burden of defending the suit. This possibility be-
comes even more likely when because of the defendant class action,
the adjudication will have a statewide effect. Under such circum-
stances, it would be most difficult for members of the defendant
class later to complain that their representation was inadequate.'10
A second factor in ascertaining whether the named defendant
is an adequate representative of the class is that he have an inten-
tion to challenge the plaintiffs' allegations. 0 5 The underlying con-
cern is that if the named party has no intention to defend on the
merits and a judgment is entered against the class, the absent mem-
bers' due process guarantees would be seriously jeopardized. Under
such circumstances, the typicality prerequisite of (a) (3) would also
be wanting since the named party's defense would no longer be
"typical" to that of the rest of the class.'0
Several alternatives are available to a court when the named
defendant does not contest the plaintiffs' legal claim. The most
obvious is to deny the defendant class on the basis that the named
party neither adequately represents the interests of the class nor
possesses defenses typical with those of the class. If the defendant
class is denied, however, the plaintiff class would also have to fall
because of lack of privity.107 For example, if the defendant class of
individual party defendant in the litigation thereby making his intervention unnecessary.
Many United States district courts also have local rules requiring the party raising the
constitutionality of a state statute to immediately advise the court in writing so that the state
may be notified. E.g., Rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana 16 (1974).
104. In Pennsylvania Ass'n, Ret'd Child. v. Commonwealth of Pa., 343 F. Supp. 279,
292 (E.D. Pa. 1972), an absent member of the defendant class complained that his representa-
tion had been inadequate. The court responded to that allegation by simply stating "...
we are satisfied that the Attorney General adequately represented the interests of all of the
defendants before the objectors entered the case." See also Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768
(M.D. Ala. 1973) (attorney general took complete control in litigating the suit).
105. Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497, 499 (N.D.
Ill. 1969), appeal dismissed sub nom., Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059 (7th
Cir. 1970).
106. See notes 62-76 supra and accompanying text.
107. See note 16 supra. Another reason why a plaintiff class would not be permitted is
because the named plaintiff is no longer a member of the plaintiff class. Because of the named
defendant's acquiescence, the named plaintiff will have received his requested relief, whereas
the other members of his class will not. It is uniformly agreed that one may not represent a
class of which he is not a part. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1962).
[Vol. 9
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township trustees was denied, the plaintiff could not maintain a
plaintiff class of all indigents within the state because the majority
of the members of plaintiff's class was not injured by the single
remaining trustee defendant. 08
This option has serious defects despite the fact that the individ-
ual plaintiff's legal claim may be personally satisfied. Since a plain-
tiff class could no longer be maintained, the members of that class
would continue to sustain the same injury unless they institute
similar suits against their trustees. This option also produces the
possibility of different standards of statutory conduct within a sin-
gle state. Since the named official has conceded plaintiff's claim,
presumably he will no longer enforce the residency statute against
indigents within his township. However, the other trustees, since
they are no longer defendant parties, may continue to enforce the
statute. Concepts of equal protection and common sense suggest a
better solution.
A preferable alternative would be to proceed as the Supreme
Court of California did recently in Romirez v. Brown. ,o9 In that case,
three ex-felons sought a writ of mandate to force certain county
clerks to register them to vote. The three officials did not contest
the plaintiffs' claim and advised the court that they would register
the ex-felons. A fourth clerk, who was defending similar litigation
in a lower court, expressed desire to intervene so that her rights
would not be prejudiced."0 Because the case posed a question of
broad public interest, the clerk was joined as an additional party
108. Technically, the size of the plaintiff class could be reduced to include only those
indigents injured by the single trustee, for instance, all indigents residing in Portage Town-
ship. However, this procedure would still fail to achieve the major goal of a defendant class
action: uniform statutory construction and practice throughout an entire state.
109. 9 Cal. 3d 199, 107 Cal. Rptr. 137, 507 P.2d 1345 (1973), rev'd sub nom., Richardson
v. Romirez, 94 S. Ct. 2656 (1974).
110. Confusion exists as to whether the defendant officials are defined as a defendant
class or not. The suit was originally filed in the Supreme Court of California as a petition for
writ of mandate. Named as defendants were three county election officials, "individually and
as representatives of the class of all other" county election officials in the state. The Supreme
Court of California did not specifically discuss the procedural issue of whether the suit was a
proper defendant class. Whether the court did or did not has little importance for the present
discussion since state officials, by reason of a "special relationship" to the court of last resort
in their state, are bound by its conclusion. 94 S. Ct. at 2660. Cf. North Dakota State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
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defendant. This latter clerk took the burden of litigating the case
on the merits for the entire class."'
Institution of such a procedure, that of providing for some type
of notice to members of the class and allowing interested members
the chance to intervene, solves both of the deficiencies of the first
approach discussed without jeopardizing the due process rights of
the absent members of the class. Through a single suit, a final
adjudication would achieve uniformity of statutory interpretation
and conduct. This would thereby grant appropriate relief to all
members of the plaintiff class. In addition, if the intervening offi-
cial(s) adequately represents the class, the absent members' due
process guarantees would be fully protected.
In sum, although Rule 23(a)(4) raises special considerations
and corresponding problems for a defendant class of public officials,
none are so insurmountable that the benefits of such a procedural
device should not be utilized, at least when judicial caution is pro-
perly exercised.
RULE 23(b)
A class action may be maintained when all four of the general
prerequisites set forth in Rule 23(a) are satisfied, and in addition,
when it falls within the purview of any one of the three alternative
categories in Rule 23(b). The category most frequently utilized and
which has stirred the most controversy is the common-question
class action of (b)(3).
The (b)(3) category
For a class action to be formulated under (b)(3), the moving
party must satisfy two essential prerequisites. First, the common
questions of law or fact found in (a)(2) must "predominate over
questions affecting only individual members."'' 2 Without this pre-
dominance of common questions, the claims or defenses of the class
members will not be "sufficiently similar so that adjudication by
representation will be appropriate."" 3 In addition, (b)(3) requires
111. The intervening defendant sufficiently demonstrated that she was an adequate
representative. Although she lost her case in the Supreme Court of California, she obtained
a reversal in the United States Supreme Court.
112. FEn. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
113. Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv. 629, 642 (1965).
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that the class action device be "superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."", The rule
enumerates four, non-exhaustive factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether the class action device is a superior method. They
include the absent members' interests in personal control over their
claims or defenses, whether the issue has been previously litigated,
the desirability of the particular forum and manageability prob-
lems. The superiority factor, together with the predominance ele-
ment, reflect the general objective of the drafters of Rule 23 that
class actions should be maintained only when they would achieve
economies of time, effort, expense and promote uniformity
of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrific-
ing procedural fairness or bring about other undesirable
results."5
Generally, the class members in a (b)(3) type class action enjoy
less affinity with each other than the other types of class actions
found under 23(b). In (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions, class members are
joined together either by the relief sought or the adverse side effects
of separate litigation. This presupposes that the class shares more
than mere commonality of questions."' In (b)(3) class actions, the
commonality of certain questions of law or fact is all that binds the
members of the class together. As a result, the drafters of Rule 23
created several procedural safeguards peculiar to the (b) (3) category
to insure protection of the absent class members' interests. These
safeguards include a mandatory notice provision, a right of auto-
matic intervention and most importantly for the present discussion,
the opportunity to "opt-out" of the class action."' Those members
of the class who for a variety of reasons affirmatively request exclu-
sion from the action are not bound by the final judgment."' While
they may not partake of the fruits should their named representa-
tive win on the merits, neither do they lose. This "opt-out" provi-
114. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(b)(3).
115. Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102-03 (1966).
116. Therefore most cases satisfying either (b)(1) or (b)(2) could also be maintained
under (b)(3). Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 390 n.130 (1967). See Van Gemert
v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
1975]
et al.: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23: A Defendant Class Action wit
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1975
390 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9
sion has significant ramifications for any class composed of defen-
dants. A defendant class whose members could freely remove them-
selves from the litigation would obviously not be very meaningful."'
The opting out of any number of trustees from the case challenging
the constitutionality of the state residency statute would completely
frustrate the purpose in orginally creating such a class.2 0 Thus, as
a practical matter, the (b)(3) category of class actions is totally
ineffective and useless when applied to any defendant class. 2 ,
The (b)(2) category
A Rule 23(b)(2) class action is maintainable when
the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declara-
tory relief with respect to the class as a whole.In
Rule 23(b)(2), as opposed to the other subsections of 23(b), is
concerned with the type of relief sought.'" It is intended to provide
the primary vehicle when final injunctive or declaratory relief is
requested. 2' Through such a medium, the legality of a party's be-
119. This was noted in Benzoni v. Greve, 54 F.R.D. 450, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), a securi-
ties fraud case, where one of the cited reasons for denying a defendant class action was that
the defendants would probably "opt-out" under (b)(3). See Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14, 17
(N.D. Ohio 1972); Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 164 U.S.P.Q. 552, 553 (D. Md.
1970).
120. As a result, courts and commentators urge that a class action be maintained under
(b)(1) and/or (b)(2) if possible, rather than under (b)(3). This is to give full res judicata effect
to a judgment and avoid the "opt-out" provision in (b)(3) which thwarts the policies underly-
ing the (b)(1) and (b)(2) class suits. See Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 447
(5th Cir. 1973); Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14, 17 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Johnson v. City of Baton
Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295, 300-01 (E.D. La. 1970); Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125,
130-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 3B MoolE 23.32[3], at 526-27; 7A WIGHT & MIuLER § 1777, at
49-50.
121. But see Dudley v. Southeastern Factor and Fin. Corp., 57 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ga.
1972) (defendant class of all present and former shareholders who had received certain pre-
ferred shares maintained under (b)(3)); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Woodahl, 308 F. Supp. 1002
(D. Mont. 1970) (defendant class of all county attorneys in Montana apparently maintained
under (b)(3)).
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
123. Subsection (b)(2) was added in the complete revision of Rule 23 in 1966. There was
no comparable provision in the earlier rule. 7A WmRGHT & MnLER § 1775, at 19.
124.
If the Rule 23(a) prerequisites have been met and injunctive or declaratory relief has
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havior with respect to an entire class can be firmly settled in a single
action. 25 As a result, the (b)(2) category is particularly suitable for
accommodating civil rights actions. 2 '
When a group of individuals has been injured by a defendant
and it seeks to redress the wrong by requesting injunctive relief,
(b)(2) becomes the viable medium for the maintenance of a plaintiff
class. The plaintiff's burden in establishing a Rule 23(b)(2) class is
relatively light. The only requirements are that defendant's con-
duct, either affirmatively or negatively, be generally applicable to
the plaintiff class, and that final injunctive relief be requested
which would be appropriate to all members of the plaintiff class.121
When, however, the plaintiff attempts to form a defendant class
under the same category, he finds that (b)(2) is permeated with
problems. This section will closely examine Rule 23(b)(2) in order
to demonstrate the nature and extent of these difficulties. Specifi-
cally, it will show that irrespective of judicial decisions to the con-
trary, 28 a defendant class cannot be maintained under the (b)(2)
category.
been requested, the action should be allowed to proceed under subdivision (b)(2).
7A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1775, at 23.
125. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HAIv. L. REv. 356, 389 (1967).
126. Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966); Contract Buyers League v.
F. & F. Inv., 48 F.R.D. 7, 13 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
127. 7A WIGwr & MImLER § 1775, at 19.
128. The following cases have maintained a defendant class under subsection (b)(2):
Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (all banking institutions who have carried
out extrajudicial nonconsensual repossession of motor vehicles under color of the challenged
statutes); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720 (D. Conn. 1973) (all persons who
have garnisheed debts owing the plaintiff class); Danforth v. Christian, 351 F. Supp. 287
(W.D. Mo. 1972) (all officers and other officials charged with the enforcement of the laws pre-
scribing qualifications for registration and voting); Pennsylvania Ass'n, Ret'd Child. v. Com-
monwealth of Pa., 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (all school districts in Pennsylvania);
Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 56 F.R.D. 435 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (all state universities and
colleges in Pennsylvania); Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R. C. L. Electronics, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531
(D.N.H. 1971) (class of patent infringers); Ferguson v. Williams, 330 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D.
Miss. 1971), vacated on merits, 405 U.S. 1036 (1972) (all county election officials in the state);
Rakes v. Coleman, 318 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Va. 1970) (all state court judges empowered to
commit persons); United States v. Cantrell, 307 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. La. 1969) (all persons
operating bars and cocktail lounges in Plaquemines County); Research Corp. v. Pfister Asso-
ciated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1969), appeal dismissed sub nom., Research
Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970) (class of patent infringers); Techno-
graph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill. 1968)
(class of patent infringers).
There are numerous cases in which defendant classes have been maintained, yet the
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For purposes of analysis, (b) (2) can be broken into two separate
components: (1) the opposing party's conduct must be "generally
applicable" to the class, and (2) the opposing party's conduct
"thereby" makes appropriate final injunctive relief (or correspond-
ing declaratory relief) with respect to the entire class.
1. The opposing party's conduct must be "generally applicable" to
the class
This prerequisite requires that the party opposing the class act
or refuse to act and that this conduct be "generally applicable" to
the proposed class. This latter clause serves a particularly impor-
tant function in plaintiff class actions because it aids in identifying
who is a member of the plaintiff class and in defining the size of that
class.'" The phrase "generally applicable" does not require that the
defendant act directly against each member of the purported class.
Rather, it is satisfied when the defendant's conduct entails such a
consistent pattern of activity that it would affect all persons simi-
larly situated with the named plaintiff if the opportunity would be
presented.' 30 As a result, those persons who are in a like situation
with the named plaintiff and who would be similarly affected by the
defendant's conduct, should be included as members of the plaintiff
class. In the absence of conduct by the party opposing the class
I
precise category of subsection (b) was not stated in the reported decision. Since most of the
cases involved civil rights claims and since injunctive relief was the primary relief sought,
presumably the defendant class was maintained under (b)(2). Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp.
768 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (all officials, at least including all district attorneys, empowered to take
action against the plaintiff class under the provisions of the ethics statute); Hadnott v. Amos,
295 F. Supp. 1003 (M.D. Ala.), rev'd on other grounds, 394 U.S. 358 (1968) (the probate judges
of all counties in Alabama); Jehovah's Witnesses in State of Wash. v. King County Hosp.,
278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd on other grounds, 390 U.S. 598, reh. denied, 391
U.S. 961 (1968) (all medical doctors in Washington employed in public institutions); Wash-
ington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), afl'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (all jailors and
wardens in Alabama).
129. Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1367 (1st Cir. 1972); Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class
Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. Rav. 629, 648 (1965).
130.
Action or inaction is directed to a class within the meaning of this subsection even if
it has taken effect or is threatened only as to one or few members of the class,
provided it is based on grounds generally applicable to the class.
Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966). See 3B MOORE 23.40, at 651; 7A WUGHT
& Mni" § 1775, at 19; Comment, Rule 23: Categories in Subsection (b), 10 B.C. IND. & COM.
L. Rav. 539, 542 (1969).
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[here, the defendant], the plaintiff class would not be readily as-
certainable.
In the context of a defendant class of public officials, this same
clause loses much of its practical utility. The same criterion must
be met: the opposing party's [now, plaintiff's] conduct must be
generally applicable to the [defendant] class. A prima facie show-
ing of this requirement by the plaintiff will not be difficult. How-
ever, the reason underlying this requirement, to identify and define
the size of the class [here, the defendant class] has disappeared.
A defendant class of public officials is defined irrespective of any
conduct by the plaintiffs. When the constitutionality of a statute is
being challenged, the defendant officials, whether sheriffs, township
trustees, clerks or justices of the peace, are already bound in a
relationship. They are linked by a bond of legal commonality in that
they are officials of a single state and its subordinate units of gov-
ernment, and they act under common statutory authority. Being so
juridicially linked, their class is easily ascertainable and definable.
When certain practices by the defendant officials are being chal-
lenged, such as the setting of bail exclusively by reference to set bail
bond schedules, the defendant class is defined as all those officials
participating in the unlawful conduct. In this type of case, it is the
defendants' own conduct which further defines their own class. The
plaintiffs' conduct in no way alters the membership or size of this
type of defendant class. Therefore, this clause of Rule 23(b)(2) as
applied to defendant class actions fails to serve any useful purpose.
Several alternative conclusions can be drawn from this want of
utility. First, this prerequisite can be ignored as being superfluous.
If ignored, this clause of (b)(2) will be met de facto in every defend-
ant class action sought by a plaintiff class. Second, the rule cannot
apply to a defendant class because to apply a rule without substance
or meaning is unjustified. Based upon this conclusion, a defendant
class cannot be maintained under Rule 23(b)(2). After examination
of the second prerequisite, the latter conclusion is the only reason-
able choice.
2. The opposing party's conduct "thereby" makes appropriate
final injunctive relief (or corresponding declaratory relief) with re-
spect to an entire class
This prerequisite demands that final injunctive or declaratory
relief be sought. In the context of a typical plaintiff class action, it
19751 393
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is plaintiffs who request the final relief. The basis for the relief is
the opposing party's conduct [that of the defendant]. It is defend-
ant's conduct which "thereby" gives rise to plaintiffs' claim for
relief. Therefore, the final relief must follow the claim for relief; the
relief must be sought in favor of the plaintiff class, or similarly,
against the party opposing the class.' 3'
This same clause when read in light of a defendant class of pub-
lic officials becomes problematical. It would read literally: "plain-
tiffs' conduct thereby makes the relief sought appropriate.""13 As
noted above, the relief must be sought against the party opposing
the class, here the plaintiff class. However, the defendants will
usually have no need to request injunctive relief against the plain-
tiff class. Without this affirmative request for relief, a defendant
class cannot fulfill this criterion.'3 As a result, a defendant class can
neither be maintained nor enjoined under Rule 23(b)(2).
131. 7A WIuGHT & MIJER § 1775, at 21-22. See Note, Class Actions in Patent Suits:
An Improper Method of Litigating Patents?, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 474, 489-90 (1971).
132. Since a plaintiff is usually the only party which seeks relief, to interpret this phrase
literally would permit plaintiff by his own action or inaction to justify injunctive relief against
other parties, namely, defendants. Such a construction would be completely intolerable. See
3B MooRE 23.40, at 67 n.17 (Supp. 1974).
133. Several courts in the patent infringement area have struggled with this clause in
order to maintain a defendant class under (b)(2). By doing so, however, they have merely
created legal fictions. In Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc.,
285 F. Supp. 714, 723 (N.D. I1. 1968), the court found that plaintiffs (patent holders) had
acted on grounds generally applicable to the defendant class by: (1) obtaining patents, (2)
notifying some alleged infringers of the patents, (3) threatening some of them with infringe-
ment suits unless they take licenses, and (4) by bringing civil actions against some of them.
Since defendants amended their counterclaims to pray for declaratory and injunctive relief,
the court permitted a defendant class of patent infringers under (b)(2). Likewise, in Research
Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497, 500 (N.D. Ill. 1969), appeal
dismissed sub nom., Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970), the
court found that the plaintiff acted on grounds applicable to the defendant class citing
Technograph. However, in Research, the defendants did not even counterclaim for injunctive
relief. Nevertheless, the court believed that should defendants win on the merits, they would
request such relief to prevent plaintiffs from suing them again. The court in Research also
held that a defendant class was properly maintainable under (b)(2). The legal fiction created
by these two courts is demonstrated in two ways. First, the maintenance of a defendant class
under (b)(2) solely on a "belief" or "assumption" that defendants may request injunctive
relief is a practice certainly not in accord with Rule 23. The (b)(2) category demands that
injunctive relief be actually requested. Second, the plaintiff's various enumerated "acts"
towards the defendant class of infringers do not make the final injunctive relief appropriate.
It is rather the defendant class' own acts (by disregarding plaintiff's parents) which justifies
the injunctive relief and which becomes the primary subject matter of the suit. See Note,
[Vol. 9
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Numerous courts have nevertheless employed (b)(2) as a basis
for establishing a defendant class."4 While it is unfortunate that the
majority of these courts have failed to supply reasons to support
their holdings, several can be suggested. First, a defendant class
may have also been maintained under other subsections of Rule
23(b), thereby making an exhaustive inquiry less necessary. 35 Sec-
ond, the defendants themselves may not have objected to a determi-
nation allowing the case to proceed as a class action. 3 Finally, the
overwhelming policy considerations in favor of a defendant class of
this type may have colored the courts' reasoning process.
One court did, however, briefly articulate its justification in
maintaining a defendant class of all school districts within the
state. ' 37 Applying Rule 23(b)(2) to the facts of the case, the court
held that
the party opposing the class (of defendants) (i.e., the plain-
tiff class) has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class (of defendants) (e.g., the plaintiffs
have acted in such a way that the defendants are excluding
them from public schools) making appropriate final injunc-
tive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to
the class (of defendants) as a whole. 3
Although at first glance it would appear that this court solved
the problem of fitting defendant classes into Rule 23(b)(2), a closer
examination proves otherwise. Admittedly, plaintiffs will have
acted on grounds generally applicable to the defendant class,
Class Actions in Patent Suits: An Improper Method of Litigating Patents?, 1971 U. ILL. L.F.
474, 489 (1971).
134. See note 128 supra.
135. Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (b)(1); Danforth v. Christian,
351 F. Supp. 287 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (b)(1)(A); Pennsylvania Ass'n, Ret'd Child. v. Common-
wealth of Pa., 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (b)(1)(B); Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R. C. L.
Electronics, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531 (D.N.H. 1971) (b)(1)(A) & (B); Ferguson v. Williams, 330 F.
Supp. 1012 (N.D. Miss. 1971), vacated on merits, 405 U.S. 1036 (1972) (b)(3); United States
v. Cantrell, 307 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. La. 1969) (b)(1)(B); Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated
Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1969), appeal dismissed sub nom., Research Corp.
v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970) (b)(1)(A) & (B); Technograph Printed
Circuits, Ltd. v: Methode Electronics, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (b)(1)(A) & (B).
136. Rakes v. Coleman, 318 F. Supp. 181, 190 (E.D. Va. 1970).
137. Pennsylvania Ass'n, Ret'd Child. v. Commonwealth of Pa., 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.
Pa. 1972).
138. Id. at 292 n.32.
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thereby superficially meeting the first prerequisite. As noted earlier
though, this requirement is superfluous to a defendant class because
of its failure to serve the underlying purpose of identifying and
defining the defendant class.'39 The court also held that the second
requirement was met because the relief, though sought by plaintiffs,
was also appropriate to the defendant class. Another court stated
on this point that "a decision on the constitutionality of the statutes
in question is appropriate and will have a declaratory effect on each
class as a whole.""'4 Such a construction, however, merely reiterates
the truism that a legal determination of legal rights will affect all
parties involved. Since this relationship is present in every legal
determination, this clause when applied to a defendant class with
only the plaintiff class seeking relief, is meaningless. When added
together with the first prerequisite, Rule 23(b)(2) as applied to de-
fendant classes becomes a rule solely of form, a rule without sub-
stance or purpose. The practical consequence of such a construction
is that a defendant class has been formulated only by meeting the
requirements of Rule 23(a). This is in clear contravention to the
wording of Rule 23 which requires that at least one of the categories
of subsection (b) must be met.'
The (b)(1) category
Rule 23(b)(1) considers the prejudicial result that separate non-
class suits may have to the different parties involved.' The cate-
gory is structurally divided into two clauses, one from the viewpoint
of the party opposing the class, the other, from the class itself.
139. See pages 31-32 supra.
140. Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1973). This case is the only
reported case in which the defendant directly challenged, though unsuccessfully, the inappli-
cability of Rule 23(b)(2) to defendant class actions. In support of his position, the defendant
apparently only relied on a statement from 7A Wmor & MMLER § 1775, that the relief must
be sought in favor of the class. The court was not persuaded by this single statement of
authority.
141. FED. R. Cw. P. 23(b). See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 561 (2d Cir.
1968), rev'd on other grounds, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
142. As one writer has noted, category (b)(1) requires the trial judge:
to view the total effect of a single adjudication, including not only formal resjudicata
consequences but also adverse practical effects upon parties opposing the class or
upon absentees which might influence the decision as to how widely the judgment
should operate.
Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv. 629, 645 (1965).
[Vol. 9
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Clause (A)
The (b)(1)(A) type of class action focuses upon the adverse
effects that non-class adjudications may have on the party opposing
the class. Actions under clause (A) may be maintained when
the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of. .. inconsist-
ent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible
standards of conduct to the party opposing the class.'
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) entails two requirements. Both requisites
must be satisfied before this category may be invoked. The first
requires the existence of a risk of multiple adjudications on the same
issue. " ' The likelihood must exist that at least some of the individ-
ual members of the class will bring or defend separate lawsuits
against the party opposing the class. For example, in Eisen v. Carli-
sle & Jacquelin, "I the plaintiff was not allowed to maintain a plain-
tiff class of all odd-lot investors on the New York Stock Exchange
under clause (A) because the individual class members were small
claimants who could not individually afford the expense of lengthy
anti-trust litigation. Since the risk was small that plaintiffs would
bring their own individual suits, there was little danger that the
party opposing the class would face "incompatible standards of con-
duct." All of the practical reasons for evoking class action treatment
disappear in the absence of this risk of multiple litigation.
In addition, the risk must also exist that as a result of multiple
litigation, the party opposing the class could be faced with "incon-
sistent standards of conduct" to different members of the same
class.'46 That is, the party opposing the class must be placed in a
"conflicted position" with respect to individual members of the
class. '4 This "conflicted position" is the hazard which clause (A)
143. FED. R. Cr. P. 23(b)(1)(A) (emphasis supplied).
144. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1773, at 18. See Comment, Rule 23: Categories of Subsec-
tion (b), 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 539, 540-41 (1969).
145. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973),
vacated, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974). See Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587, 590 (N.D.
Ill. 1972).
146. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A). See 7A WRIGHT & MLER § 1773, at 9.
147. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 388 (1967).
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was specifically designed to remedy. 4 ' The rule was not intended to
correct different results as to adjudications involving different mem-
bers of the class when the results are distinguishable on the basis
of different facts.'49 This clause, therefore, serves a particularly nec-
essary function when, for example, a single governmental office or
officer is in a position with respect to an entire class of people.
Should different results ensue from separate adjudications on the
same issue, the governmental agency would be placed in a most
unusual and precarious situation. 10
A (b)(1)(A) class action, as opposed to the (b)(2) category, does
not in and of itself preclude the maintenance of a defendant class.
148.
The provision [(b)(1)(A)] was to obviate the actual or virtual dilemma which would
... confront the party opposing the class when incompatible adjudications would
trap him in the inescapable legal quagmire of not being able to comply with one such
judgment without violating the terms of another .... The inconsistencies and uncer-
tainties [defendants being ordered to refund contributions to some members of the
plaintiff class, but not others] would not place defendants in a dilemma of the sort
contemplated by (b)(1)(A), for the varying adjudications would not preclude compli-
ance with the judgment in each case.
Walker v. City of Houston, 341 F. Supp. 1124, 1131 (S.D. Texas 1971). See La Mar v. H. &
B. Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 466 (9th Cir. 1973).
Thus, some courts have held that actions for money damages cannot be maintained
under (b)(1)(A), even though the party opposing the class might have to pay some class
members, yet not others. It is argued that this would only result in inconsistent actions for
the individual defendant and would not create "inconsistent standards of conduct" by which
the party opposing the class would not be able to comply with one judgment without violating
another. Albert v. United States Indus., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 491, 499 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Rodriguez
v. Family Publications Servs., Inc., 57 F.R.D. 189, 192 (C.D. Cal. 1972). See Comment, Rule
23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 539, 540 (1969).
Also, since the rule was drafted to protect a defendant (the party opposing the class in
the typical plaintiff class action) from being placed in a "conflicted position," some courts
have not permitted a plaintiff class under (b)(1)(A) when the defendant, by opposing the class
action motion, was apparently willing to accept the risk. Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
57 F.R.D. 89, 92 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Kenny v. Landis Financial Group, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 939,
951 (N.D. Iowa 1972).
149. Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Inv., 48 F.R.D. 7, 14 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
150. The Advisory Committee for the Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure's Note illus-
trates clause (A) of category (b)(1) by describing a situation in which a municipality in
separate actions is called upon to declare a bond issue invalid. Separate actions could result
in different and inconsistent decisions regarding the legality and validity of the bond issue.
The municipality as the party opposing the class would then be forced to establish incompati-
ble courses of conduct by having to choose one court's decree over another. Advisory Comm.
Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 100 (1966). See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARv. L. Rav. 356, 388 (1967).
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The rule only seeks to avoid the adverse effects of inconsistent adju-
dications to the party opposing the class. It is irrelevant whether the
class is a plaintiff or defendant one as long as the party opposing
the class would be placed in a "conflicted position." For example,
this subdivision has been used in patent litigation where the patent
owner formulates a defendant class of the alleged infringers.", If the
issue of patent validity were litigated in separate and individual
actions, the possibility would exist that inconsistent determinations
would be reached in different jurisdictions. This would place the
patent holder in the anomalous position of having his patent de-
clared valid and enforceable against some of the defendant infrin-
gers, but not against others.'
The general construction of (b)(1)(A), however, suggests that
the party opposing the class can only be a single, non-class party.
This poses difficulty for the type of suit envisioned by this note
where a plaintiff and defendant class are maintained concurrently
in the same adjudication. The choice of the phrase "the party op-
posing the class" implies that either the defendant or plaintiff must
be a single party. This construction is further strengthened by the
Advisory Committee's Notes. In describing the type of problem
which this clause sought to obviate, they state:
One person may have rights against, or be under duties
toward, numerous persons constituting a class, and be so
positioned that conflicting or varying adjudications in law-
suits with individual members of the class might establish
incompatible standards to govern his conduct. . . . The
151. Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R. C. L. Electronics, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531 (D.N.H. 1971);
Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc. 310 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1969), appeal
dismissed sub noma., Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970);
Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill.
1968).
152. The argument that varying adjudications established inconsistent standards of
conduct for the patent holder was directly rejected in Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data Corp.,
164 U.S.P.Q. 552 (D. Md. 1970). The court made an analogy to the situation where the same
case is tried in different jurisdictions and stated that:
the fact that the law in one jurisdiction may differ from that in another does not
impose different types of duty on the plaintiff or defendant; simply, they take the
law as it is in a particular jurisdiction.
Id. at 553. See Note, Class Actions in Patent Suits: An Improper Method of Litigating
Patents?, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 474, 486 (1971).
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matter has been stated thus: "The felt necessity for a class
action is greatest when the courts are called upon to order
or sanction the alteration of the status quo in circumstances
such that a large number of persons are in a position to call
on a single person to alter the status quo, or to complain if
it is altered, and the possibility exists that (the) actor might
be called upon to act in inconsistent ways."' 53
Although the (b)(1)(A) category has been frequently used in
constitutional and civil rights cases, all of the reported cases have
either been brought by, or more typically, against a single party. For
example, such actions have included a suit to enjoin state officers
from terminating unemployment compensation without a hear-
ing,'54 an action seeking a declaration of eligibility for fatherhood
deferments under the Selective Service Act'55 and an action adjudi-
cating the rights of food stamp recipients under the Federal Food
Stamp Act of 1964.156 Even though other parties may have been
named as defendants in these actions, at least one of the party
defendants was at the apex of the governmental agency under at-
tack. That party was the single person through whom the status quo
could be altered which would affect all members of the class. Be-
cause of his position, he had control and corresponding responsibil-
ity for all subordinate members who were in privity with each mem-
ber of the plaintiff class.
In the type of litigation contemplated by this note, there is no
single head official who can change the status quo by being singly
made a party to the litigation. This lack of a single person is the
chief purpose in formulating a defendant class because a decision
regarding a statute's validity cannot be effectively and uniformly
enforced in any other way. It is precisely at this point where a class
of defendants is most urgently needed that Rule 23(b)(1)(A) appar-
ently becomes inapplicable. The problem can be best illustrated by
referral to the introductory example.
153. Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 100 (1966) (emphasis supplied).
154. Crow v. California Dep't of Human Resources, 325 F. Supp. 1314 (N.D. Cal. 1970),
cert. denied, 408 U.S. 924 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 490 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1973).
155. Gregory v. Hershey, 51 F.R.D. 188 (E.D. Mich. 1970), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom., Gregory v. Tarr, 436 F.2d 513 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971).
156. Stewart v. Butz, 356 F. Supp. 1345 (W.D. Ky. 1973), afl'd on other grounds, 491
F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1974).
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Plaintiff, as the party opposing the purported class, has a claim
against the particular trustee who invoked the state durational resi-
dency statute in denying plaintiff assistance. Plaintiff does not have
a claim against those trustees from whom he has not been harmed.57
Therefore, plaintiff could not formulate a defendant class of all
trustees in the state. It may be contended, however, that he could
move to another township in which he would again be denied town-
ship assistance. This would place plaintiff in a "conflicted posi-
tion." It is doubtful, especially after the restrictive approach of
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,"' whether plaintiffs potentiality for
moving would create a sufficient or substantial risk of multiple ad-
judication. At the time of the first suit, it would be only conjecture
whether plaintiff would move. It is even more questionable whether
plaintiff would still require poor-relief assistance. Further, it is only
speculative whether the trustee in the township in which plaintiff
moved would enforce the statute against him.'" As a result, a de-
fendant class of public officials cannot be maintained under clause
(A) if the party opposing the defendant class of trustees was read
solely as a single, indigent plaintiff.
An argument can be made that the phrase, "the party opposing
the class," be read as the plaintiff class of all indigents in the state
denied poor-relief on the basis of the residency statute. The class of
plaintiff-indigents as a whole would equally have rights against the
entire class of township trustees since all of the plaintiffs are subject
157. For a plaintiff to have standing, he must demonstrate injury to himself by the
parties whom he sues before he can state a cause of action. Weiner v. Bank of Prussia, 358 F.
Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (defendant class of all national banks within the court's jurisdic-
tion denied because plaintiff did not have standing to sue those unnamed defendant banks
from whom he had not personally suffered injury.) See La Mar v. H. & B. Novelty & Loan
Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973). See also note 16 supra.
158. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973),
vacated, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
159. For example, in Wallace v. Brewer, 315 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1970), the plain-
tiffs, Black Muslims, sought to enjoin all county officials, including all district attorneys and
sheriffs in Alabama. The individual defendants were allegedly attempting to prevent the
plaintiffs, their friends and associates, from developing a farm in St. Clair County. The court,
in denying certification for a defendant class, stated:
It is only speculative whether plaintiffs will attempt to develop farms in other areas
of Alabama and, if they attempt to do so, whether the officials in that county will
initiate a planned program to prevent the development.
Id. at 438.
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to the same statute which all of the defendants are required to
enforce. Concededly, different results through individual separate
suits would not necessarily result in different standards of conduct
for each individual township trustee.' 0 However, as noted earlier, '
the different results could not be explained on the basis of different
sets of facts.' More importantly, multiple adjudications could re-
sult in different standards of conduct regarding the same statute -
the real party defendant in this type of action.' 3 The right of each
plaintiff is not against each individual trustee per se, but rather
against the residency statute. The statute is, in effect, the single
mechanism at the apex of the dispute which is in privity with and
affects each individual plaintiff-indigent within the state. Under
this more permissive interpretation, a plaintiff and defendant class
could be simultaneously maintained under the (b)(1)(A) category.' 4
Clause (B)
Clause (B) seeks to protect the interests of those members of
the class not actually participating in the litigation. A (b)(1)(B)
class action is maintainable when
adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class would as a practical matter be dispositive of the inter-
est of other members not parties to the adjudications or
160. The fact that several courts may reach inconsistent decisions regarding the dura-
tional residency statute would not place individual township trustees in a "conflicted posi-
tion." While some trustees may be personally ordered to refrain from using the statute and
others not, no trustee would be placed in the dilemma of not being able to comply with one
judgment without violating the terms of another.
161. See note 149 supra.
162. When the constitutionality of a statute or regulation is being facially attacked,
varying factual distinctions, if any, are irrelevant. See notes 53-55 supra and accompanying
text.
163. This was recognized in Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1973),
where the court stated that "[tihe relief sought here is really against the statute, not the
defendants."
164. Danforth v. Christian, 351 F. Supp. 287 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (defendant class of all
election officials in the state); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619 (D.
Kan. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 438 F.2d 704 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 951 (1971) (defendant classes of landowners and lessee-producers). Plaintiff and
defendant classes were also maintained in Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa.
1973). However, the court did not state precisely under which clause of (b)(1) these classes
were maintained.
[Vol. 9
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substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests. '"
As opposed to the requirements of (b)(1)(A), it is not necessary
to establish that the risk of separate actions is feasible or likely.'6
The risk is not in separate adjudications, but rather that the absent
members of the class will have their interests effectively impaired
or impeded should the suit proceed as an individual non-class ac-
tion.'67 Nor does the rule require that the adjudications be legally
binding on the absent members. It simply states that a separate,
non-class action "as a practical matter" would adversely affect the
absent parties. The obvious fear is that the absentees' interests
could be adversely affected without the protection of adequate rep-
resentation in the action.' 8
The application of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) to a defendant class places
the moving party, the plaintiff, in a highly unusual and abnormal
position. On the one hand, the plaintiff seeks a defendant class to
enjoin and bind legally all defendant officials in one adjudication.
On the other hand, in order to formulate the defendant class, the
plaintiff must adequately demonstrate to the court that a separate
non-class action would be dispositive of the defendants' interests
or substantially impair their ability to protect their interests. This
superficial concern for the defendants' welfare is totally antagonis-
tic to traditional notions of an adversary proceeding. It also ignores
and contradicts the realities of the plaintiffs' situation. The plain-
tiffs have no reason to be concerned whether the defendant's in-
terests or ability to defend is impaired. Normally, such an impair-
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
166. See 7A WmoGrr & MMLER § 1774, at 14.
167. This impairment is particularly dangerous when injunctive or declaratory relief is
sought by or against a class. Since such relief affects the legal relationship of all parties
involved, one's fundamental rights may be practically precluded, even without institution of
other and separate suits. This danger is particularly acute when the constitutionality of a
statute is being challenged since an individual's right may be easily impaired even though
that individual is absent from the adjudication.
168.
This clause takes in situations where the judgment in a nonclass action by or against
an individual member of the class, while not technically concluding the other mem-
bers, might do so as a practical matter. The vice of an individual action would lie in
the fact that other members of the class, thus practically concluded, would have had
no representation in the lawsuit.
Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 100-01 (1966).
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ment works towards plaintiffs' benefit, especially should he sue
them individually. Plaintiffs' purpose in maintenance of a defend-
ant class of public officials is simply to obtain uniform statutory
treatment and construction. It seems incongruous to demand from
plaintiffs proof of defendants' resultant disabilities. Nevertheless,
plaintiffs must show an impairment of the absent officials' interests
if they want to maintain a defendant class under (b)(1)(B).
Although numerous courts have maintained class actions under
clause (B),111 little case law has emerged in defining when the im-
pairment of interests is sufficiently substantial to impose class ac-
tion treatment. Differences have arisen, however, as to the proper
scope and construction of the phrase, "as a practical matter." Some
courts, predominately in Truth-in-Lending actions, have stated
that this clause should be given a literal or restrictive interpreta-
tion. 7 Precisely what courts mean by this prescription is difficult
to determine. They have, however, stated that a Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
class action should not be utilized simply because legal precedent
may be established by a separate, non-class suit.' It is argued that
the drafters of Rule 23 did not intend to create a right to a class
action simply to remedy possible stare decisis effects that individual
suits might entail. Otherwise any action satisfying the criteria of
(a)(2), commonality, and (b)(3), that the questions predominate,
would a fortiori qualify as a (b)(1)(B) class action. This, it is
thought, would render as superfluous the other subdivisions of
23(b) .172
169. See, e.g., Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972) (termination
proceedings without due process); Walker v. City of Houston, 341 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. Texas
1971) (action against a common fund); Mungin v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 318 F. Supp. 720
(M.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 897 (1971)
(action for breach of collective bargaining agreements); Collins v. Bolton, 287 F. Supp. 393
(N.D. Ill. 1968) (action to enjoin statutory assessment).
170. Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & T. Co., 60 F.R.D. 5, 7 (N.D. 111. 1973);
Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545, 547 (N.D. Ill. 1972). But see Zachary v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
171. Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons, Inc., 17 FEa. RuLES Saav. 2d 101, 105
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); Winokur v. Bell Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 16 FED. RuLEs SERV. 2d 65, 69-70
(N.D. Ill. 1972); Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587, 591 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Olson v.
Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota, 301 F. Supp. 1356, 1357 (D. Minn. 1969); William Gold-
man Theaters, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 49 F.R.D. 35, 41 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
172. Travers & Landers, The Consumer Class Action, 18 KAN. L. REv. 811, 823-24
(1970). Accord, Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89, 92 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Gold-
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1975], Art. 4
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Whatever the merits of this stare decisis argument in consumer
or other small claimant class actions, it is inappropriate when ap-
plied to a defendant class of public officials. In the first instance,
the other subdivisions of Rule 23(b) are inapplicable to a defendant
class. The "opt-out" provision inoculates the (b)(3) category as ap-
plied to defendant classes. 13The wording of the (b) (2) category does
not even allow maintenance of a defendant class of public offi-
cials.'74 To argue that (b)(1) should not apply, or apply only in the
most restrictive of situations, would be practically to destroy the
concept of defendant class actions in amended Rule 23. This is in
clear contravention of the policy of the rule which explicitly states
that "a class may sue or be sued."7 5
Furthermore, when constitutional or civil rights are involved,
the adverse effects of a non-class suit are potentially greater and
more severe than in small claimant class actions in which the stare
decisis argument has predominately arisen. In the latter type of
cases, separate trials would create only an inconvenience to each
individual plaintiff. Since each individual claim is small, the extent
of any adverse effect, if any, would be minimal. Thus, the compel-
ling necessity for class action treatment may frequently be wanting.
When the constitutionality of a statute or certain practices
thereunder are being challenged, the reasons for maintenance of a
plaintiff class action become more compelling. Since the rights are
more basic and fundamental, courts are required to maintain
especial caution to insure that these individual guarantees are not
infringed, impaired or otherwise disposed. The court's obligation
becomes particularly important when an individual is not even in
court to protect his own interests. It is understandable that courts
have taken a broader and more liberalized approach in interpreting
man v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587, 591 (N.D. Ill. 1972). But see Guy v. Abdulla, 57
F.R.D. 14, 18 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (court rejected stare decisis argument when applied to a
defendant class); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285 F.
Supp. 714, 723 (N.D. IMl. 1968) (court observed in maintenance of a defendant class under
clause (B) that adjudications on patent issues are accorded great weight in industrial rela-
tions because of the use of comity).
173. See notes 119-21 supra and accompanying text.
174. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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"as a practical matter" when such rights are at issue.'
For example, actions challenging the constitutionality of a stat-
ute by all those affected by the provision have been maintained
under (b)(1)(B). 77 Courts have uniformly held, though often with-
out explanation, that an adjudication of the statute's validity was
dispositive as to all members of the plaintiff class. 7 8 Although ex-
press reasons for such holdings have not been provided, undoubt-
edly the underlying policy considerations have played a key role.
They include the gravity of the rights involved, the due process
concerns that potential impairment through separate actions might
entail and the uniformity of statutory construction.
Using that same rationale, there should be no difficulty in
maintaining a defendant class of public officials under (b)(1)(B). An
adjudication as to a statute's validity is as dispositive of the de-
fendant class' interests as that of the plaintiff class.'79 As a result,
courts are now just beginning to utilize the (b)(1)(B) category to
maintain defendant classes of this nature. 8
NOTICE
Class members who may be bound by a judgment are entitled
176.
The trend under Rule 23 has been one of liberal construction, so that in doubtful
cases the maintenance of the class action is favored. The theory behind liberal con-
struction of the rule is that determination of the propriety of a class action is to be
made at an early stage of the proceedings; thereafter the court maintains the power
to supervise the course of the action, and to modify the order as necessary when the
facts become developed. If subsequent developments call for it, the court at its
discretion can even strike the class allegation.
Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 213, 216 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd on other
grounds, 466 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1972).
177. Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd w/o opinion, 406
U.S. 913 (1972) (constitutionality of Wayward Minor Act); Denny v. Health & Social Serv.
Bd. of the State of Wis., 285 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (constitutionality of welfare
residency statute).
178. E.g., Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd w/o opinion,
406 U.S. 913 (1972).
179.
Furthermore, as a practical matter, the adjudication of the differentials' validity with
respect to individual members of the classes both plaintiff and defendant would be
dispositive as to all class members because the differentials cannot be enforced or
withdrawn piecemeal.
Cranston v. Freeman, 290 F. Supp. 785, 788 (N.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 428
F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971).
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to the safeguards and guarantees of due process of law.""' Notice of
the pendency of a class action is one, if not the primary means for
affording absent class members their due process protection. 2 Al-
though Rule 23 establishes three categories of class actions under
subsection (b), it does not treat notice in a uniform manner. Per-
sonal notice is made explicitly mandatory only in the (b)(3) type
class action.1ss In (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions - those subsections used
most frequently by courts to maintain defendant classes - notice
is left to the discretion of the court.' The draftsmen of Rule 23 did
not precisely enunciate the reasons behind this divergent use of
notice except to state generally that the mandatory and discretion-
180. Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (all banking institutions who
have carried out extrajudicial nonconsensual repossession of motor vehicles under color of the
challenged statutes); Pennsylvania Ass'n, Ret'd Child. v. Commonwealth of Pa., 343 F. Supp.
279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (all school districts in Pennsylvania); Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14 (N.D.
Ohio 1972) (holders of voidable preferences and/or fraudulent conveyances); United States
v. Cantrell, 307 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. La. 1969) (all persons operating bars and cocktail lounges
in Plaquemines County); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619 (D. Kan.
1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 951 (1971) (defendant classes of landowners and lessee-producers of natural gas); Cran-
ston v. Freeman, 290 F. Supp. 785 (N.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 428 F.2d 822 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971) (defendant-intervening class of milk producers).
181. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
182. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Plaintiffs in
Mullane were numerous beneficiaries of defendant bank which managed a common trust
fund. Although not a true class action, the commonality of the class of beneficiaries and the
broadness of the language suggest the case is equally applicable to the present discussion.
183. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) states:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the
members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.
This provision has been uniformly interpreted to mean that personal notice is mandatory.
Travers & Landers, The Consumer Class Action, 18 KA. L. REV. 812, 828 (1970). Obviously,
one of the reasons for mandatory notice in (b)(3) class actions is to make meaningful the
absent members right to "opt-out."
It should also be observed that notice is mandatory under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) for any
dismissals or compromises of the class action.
184. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) states:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate
orders: . . . (2) requiring for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise
for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court
may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed
extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they
consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims, de-
fenses, or otherwise to come into the action.
(emphasis supplied).
et al.: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23: A Defendant Class Action wit
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1975
408 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9
ary notice provisions taken together were designed "to fulfill re-
quirements of due process to which the class action procedure is of
course subject."' 5
A heated debate has arisen as to whether notice is required in
(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions as a matter of due process. Since
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,'" the issue has
focused upon whether courts have the authority to render a decision
binding on the class in the absence of any notice to the absent
members. This conflict has become particularly acute since the
amendment to Rule 23.187 At present, this controversy has narrowed
into three judicial approaches. They include adequacy of represen-
tation, discretionary notice and mandatory notice. A brief survey of
these approaches, which are framed in the context of plaintiff
classes, will prove beneficial in elucidating the problems of notice
with respect to defendant classes.
Adequacy of Representation
A sizable number of courts'ss and commentators 8 ' have main-
185. Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 107 (1966), citing Mullane v. Central Han-
over Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) and Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
186. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
187. See note 79 supra. This conflict is most dramatically illustrated by the case of
Gregory v. Hershey, 311 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd sub nom., Gregory v. Tarr, 436
F.2d 513 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971), and the series of cases which rapidly
followed. Plaintiff in Gregory sought to maintain a plaintiff class composed of all selective
service registrants denied Il-A fatherhood status in the United States. Because of the number
of class members, the difficulty in their identification, and because the class was certified
under categories (b)(1) and (b)(2), the court did not issue notice to the plaintiff class. In
subsequent actions, members of the alleged plaintiff class asserted that the Gregory judgment
declaring them entitled to the deferments was res judicata as to the Selective Service. In
Whitmore v. Tar, 318 F. Supp. 1279 (D. Neb. 1970), vacated, 443 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971), and Germonprez v. Director of Selective Serv., 318 F. Supp. 829
(D.D.C. 1970), two courts held the judgment binding, irrespective of the lack of notice. In
Pasquier v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. La. 1970), afl'd per curiam, 444 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.
1971), and McCarthy v. Director of Selective Serv. Sys., 322 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Wis. 1970),
aff'd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1972), two courts rejected plaintiffs' res judicata
claims and held that notice is required, as a matter of due process, in all class actions.
An interesting question is presented by the Gregory series. Although plaintiffs won their
claim in the district court, the decision was reversed by the court of appeals. See Gregory v.
Tar, 436 F.2d 513 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971). Had all the subsequent courts
accepted plaintiffs' res judicata claims, would all of the members of the plaintiff class be
forever barred from bringing an action after the court of appeals reversed the decision in the
original class judgment?
188. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619 (D. Kan. 1968), aff'd in
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1975], Art. 4
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tained that there is no constitutional requirement of notice to class
members in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions. As a result, members of
a plaintiff class may be legally bound by a judgment irrespective of
receipt of notice or knowledge of the suit.90 These proponents cite
the other procedural safeguards of Rule 23 as found in the prerequis-
ites in 23(a). Most particularly, guarantee of the absent members'
due process rights is held to lie primarily with the adequacy of the
named plaintiff. 9' The theory underlying class actions is that all
members of the class are before the court in the person of the repre-
sentative. " If the absent member's interests are adequately repre-
sented, the absentee, in effect, will have had his day in court.'93
part, rev 'd in part on other grounds, 441 F.2d 704 (10thCir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1971),
is the leading case although the court did order prejudgment notice. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970). See also
Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1972); Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351
(D. Md.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 904 (1972); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 350 F. Supp. 139
(S.D. Ga. 1972); Woodward v. Rogers, 16 Fan. Rutns SEarv. 2d 241 (D.D.C. 1972); Wilczynski
v. Harder, 323 F. Supp. 509 (D. Conn. 1971); Gregory v. Hershey, 51 F.R.D. 188 (E.D. Mich.
1970), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Gregory v. Tarr, 436 F.2d 513 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 922 (1971); Clark v. American Marine Corp., 297 F. Supp. 1305 (E.D. La. 1969).
189. 7A WmOHT & MuSEn § 1784, at 142-44; 3B Moose 23.55, at 1152-53; Degnan,
Adequacy of Representation in Class Actions, 60 CALF. L. REv. 705, 718-19 (1972); Hombur-
ger, State Class Actions andthe Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 645-46 (1971); Kirkpa-
trick, Consumer Class Actions, 50 ORE. L. REv. 21, 37-38 (1970); Maraist & Sharp, Federal
Procedure's Troubled Marriage: Due Process and the Class Action, 49 TExAs L. Rev. 1, 9-10
n.37 (1970); Note, Constitutional and Statutory Requirements of Notice under Rule 23(c)(2),
10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 571, 573 (1969); Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions
Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv. 629, 638 (1965).
190. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENr § 86, comment h at 425 (1942):
If, however, the conduct of the proceeding is proper, it is immaterial that the other
members of the class were not given or did not know of the existence of the action.
191.
We think the essential requisite of due process as to absent members of the class is
not notice, but adequacy of representation of their interest by named parties.
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 636 (D. Kan. 1968), afrd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1971).
See also Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds,
438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970). The effect of the Grounds statement is somewhat diluted because
the court did in fact issue prejudgment notice to the absent members of the class concerning
the adequacy of representation and the advancement of any new claims. The court required
the "best notice practicable under the circumstances" which in that case involved "individ-
ual notice to all members of each class." 292 F. Supp. at 636.
192. See Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 254 (5th Cir. 1962).
193. See Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295, 301 (E.D. La. 1970). See also
Z. CHAFE, SOME PROBLEMS OF Equrrv 231 (1950), wherein the author states:
When the interests of the unnamed persons are closely identified with the interests
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Accordingly, due process standards will have been met, thereby
rendering as unnecessary and superfluous the requisite of notice. 9 '
Support for the position that adequacy of representation is a self-
sufficient criterion is found in Hansberry v. Lee,"5 where the Su-
preme Court stated:
It is a familiar doctrine of the federal courts that members
of a class not present as parties to the litigation may be
bound by a judgment where they are in fact adequately
represented by the parties who are present, or where they
actually participate in the conduct of the litigation in which
the members of the class are present as parties ... or where
the interests of the members of the class, some of whom are
present as parties is joint or where for any other reason the
relationship between the parties present and those who are
absent is such as legally to entitle the former to stand in
judgment for the latter."'
This position is reinforced by Rule 23 itself. Since Rule 23(c)(2)
indicates that notice must be given solely in (b)(3) class actions, it
is contended that notice is not required in the (b)(1) and (b)(2)
categories. Further support is found in the discretionary notice pro-
vision in Rule 23(d)(2). The provision for discretionary notice would
be superfluous if notice were mandatory in all types of class actions.
This implies that notice can be totally dispensed with in certain
situations without diluting the absent members' procedural safe-
guards. Presumably then, the draftsmen of the rule also believed
that the representative character of the named parties would be
sufficient protection of the absentees' due process rights."7
of the representatives and when the representatives put up a real fight, their day in
court is accepted as if the unnamed persons were in court too.
194. See Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 315 (1972).
195. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). In this case, it was emphasized that the representative action
was a recognized exception to the general rule that a judgment could not bind persons not
formally joined as parties. The use of notice to absent members of the class as a means of
satisfying due process was not directly mentioned or discussed.
196. Id. at 42-43.
197. See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 379-80 (1967). Accord, Ward &
Elliott, The Contents and Mechanics of Rule 23 Notice, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REy. 557,
561 (1969).
[Vol. 9
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It has also been suggested that as a practical matter, if the
plaintiff class meets the requirements of subsections (b)(1) and
(b)(2), the class will be more cohesive than its "amorphous" coun-
terpart in (b)(3) which is tied together only by the predominance of
common questions of law or fact.9 8 If the class is more cohesive, then
it becomes more likely that the absent members will have truly had
their day in court since the claims and defenses raised by the named
party will be identical to those of the rest of the class. In short, as
the cohesiveness of the class and the adequacy of the representation
increases, the practical need for individualized notice to insure due
process proportionately decreases."' In those situations in which the
plaintiff class is internally and externally cohesive, there arises no
need to demand notice.
Discretionary Notice
Another approach concerning the role of notice in plaintiff class
actions has been a tacit acceptance and literal construction of the
discretionary notice provision in Rule 23(d)(2). Although recogniz-
ing that notice is not mandatory for (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions,
these courts simply acknowledge and exercise their broad powers
that they "may make appropriate orders" to demand notice "for the
protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair
conduct of the action."' 0 Reliance is placed not on the underlying
198. 7A WRIGHT & MILER § 1793, at 203.
199.
In the degree that there is cohesiveness or unity in the class and the representation
is effective, the need for notice will tend to a minimum.
Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 106 (1966). See Note, Constitutional and Statutory
Requirements of Notice under 23(c)(2), 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rxv. 571, 574 n.28 (1969).
This formula has led one note writer to state:
Since the importance of notice increases with the dangers of inadequate representa-
tion, it would seem more necessary where the class is a defendant than where it is a
plaintiff.
Note, Binding Effect of Class Actions, 67 HRv. L. REv. 1059, 1063 (1954). However, the same
writer has recognized that the need for notice is less where it may be presumed that the absent
defendants would have consented to their representation, as where the class members are
associated for some common purpose aside from the particular litigation in question.
200. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2). The following courts have held that notice is not manda-
tory for (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions: Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1972);
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969); Baham v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 55 F.R.D. 478 (W.D. La. 1972); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining
Corp., 350 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Ga. 1972), modified on other grounds, 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.
1974); Mungin v. Florida East Coast Ry., 318 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd per curiam,
441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 897 (1971).
1975]
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fundamental constitutional issues, but rather upon the practicali-
ties of notice under the circumstances of each case.3 ' In determining
whether the protection of the plaintiff class necessitates notice,
courts have considered several factors.
The two most common factors have been the size of the pur-
ported class and the possibility of its being specifically identified.3 2
Generally, the smaller the class or the greater possibility of its iden-
tification, the more likely that courts will demand notice. For exam-
ple, in an employment discrimination suit against a single em-
ployer, the court required notice in a (b)(2) class action because the
plaintiff class was "relatively small" in size and easily identifia-
ble.z0 However, where the class of plaintiffs consisted of all selective
service registrants denied III-A fatherhood status in the United
States, the court did not require notice.20'
Another factor has been the nature of the action and the practi-
cal effect of a judgment on the absent members of the class. Where
injunctive relief was requested to stop the construction of a high-
way, a court held that notice was not necessary to protect the inter-
ests of those persons who may be affected by the rulings or judgment
of the court. 2 5 But where, for example, the litigation could have a
201.
[Tihe rule couldn't be plainer, it mandates 23(c)(2) notice in (b)(3) class actions,
not in 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2) class actions. Even though notice under Rule 23(d)(2) is
not required in a 23(b)(2) class action, the court still retains discretionary power
under Rule 23(d)(2) to order publication of notice to absent class members. In the
exercise of that discretion, we decline, in this case, to order such publication of notice.
Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295, 301 (E.D. La. 1970). The court preceded the
final determination with a discussion of Eisen (see notes 210-15 infra and accompanying
text):
We are not unaware that the Court of Appeals for Second Circuit has held that notice
to absent members of a class is required as a matter of due process in all representa-
tive actions, regardless of whether they are brought under 23(b)(1), (2), or (3)....
This court, after carefully studying Professor Moore's persuasive commentary, thinks
that the Eisen position is unsound.
Id. at 301.
202. See 7A WRIGHT & MULER § 1793, at 207.
203. Hayes v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 46 F.R.D. 49 (S.D. Ga. 1968).
204. Gregory v. Hershey, 51 F.R.D. 188 (E.D. Mich. 1970), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom., 436 F.2d 513 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971). In Johnson v. City of Baton
Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295 (E.D. La. 1970), one of the reasons the court did not require notice was
because the black community was well over 90,000 people.
205. Citizen's Environmental Council v. Volpe, 364 F. Supp. 286 (D. Kan.), af'd, 484
[Vol. 9
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substantial effect on the absent members' jobs, pay or promotion,
courts have been more stringent by demanding at least some form
of notice to all members of the plaintiff class.20"
A fourth factor has been the effect of notice among the class
itself. Where prisoners sought to have a statute denying them good
behavior credit for pre-sentence judgment declared unconstitu-
tional, the court did not require notice because it could be "poten-
tially disruptive of the prison routine." 07 Likewise in a suit chal-
lenging alleged discriminatory practices of the police against the
black community, the court believed that notice would only pose an
unnecessary risk of further "disturbing interracial relations in the
community while adding nothing to the lawsuit.' '2" 8 However, in an
employment discrimination suit, the court could not understand the
named plaintiff's objection to issuance of notice when there was no
foreseeability of "any possible harm or hurt flowing from notice."'
Mandatory Notice
The third approach embraces the view that concepts of due
process require mandatory notice in all representative suits, regard-
less of whether they were brought under 23(b)(1), (2) or (3). Notice
is seen as a constitutional mandate which holds supremacy over
Rule 23's guidelines regarding notice. 20 The leading case on this
F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1973). See Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351 (D. Md.), aff'd wlo
opinion, 409 U.S. 904 (1972) (plaintiffs, unemployed fathers, sought to enjoin defendants from
denying them application for A.F.D.C. benefits).
206. Hayes v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 46 F.R.D. 49 (S.D. Ga. 1968). Although notice
in (b)(2) actions is not required, "[ilt is usual, however, to authorize some form of notice to
possible claimants in class actions." McGriff v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 51 F.R.D. 479, 486 (D.S.C.
1971) (employment discrimination suit).
207. Royster v. McGuinnis, 332 F. Supp. 973, 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 410 U.S. 263 (1973).
208. Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295, 302 (E.D. La. 1970).
209. Hayes v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 46 F.R.D. 49, 56 (S.D. Ga. 1968). The court
further stated:
I think that notice to members of an identifiable, unnumerous class may be salutary
and of value. I do not foresee any possible harm or hurt flowing from notice. I cannot
understand the apparent reluctance of plaintiffs to let non-party employees know
that litigation which may affect their jobs, including higher pay and promotion, is
in progress. A disclosed rather than a secretive agency is preferable in such cases.
Id. at 56.
210. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1966) (Rules Enabling Act). In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. 1, 9 (1940), the Court stated:
Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal
1975]
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point is Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin."I It distinguished the specific
notice requirement in Rule 23(c)(2) for common question class ac-
tions (the (b)(3) category) as being merely a particularized form of
notice.2 1 2 In support of its position, the Eisen court cited the Su-
preme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 213
which stated that
[miany controversies have raged about the cryptic and
abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be
no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation
of life, liberty, or property by adjudication be preceded by
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the na-
ture of the case. 14
Although the statements in Eisen were only dicta, courts have
with increasing frequency adopted its interpretation as being dis-
positive of the issue by requiring notice to all members of a class as
a matter of due process of law.
courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to ... federal courts authority to
make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or Constitution of the United States.
(emphasis supplied).
211. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973),
vacated, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
212. Id. at 564-65.
213. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
214. Id. at 313.
215. In Cranston v. Freeman, 290 F. Supp. 785, 787 (N.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 428 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971), the court directed that
all members of the plaintiff and defendant classes receive formal notice of the pendency of
the action, "[iln view of the recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for this
Circuit in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968)." See also Schraeder v.
Selective Serv. Sys. Loc. Bd. No. 76 of Wis., 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1085 (1972); Zeilstra v. Tarr, 466 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1972); Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D.
62 (D.D.C. 1972); Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
McCarthy v. Director of Selective Serv. Sys., 322 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Wis. 1970), afl'd on
other grounds, 460 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1971). In Pasquier v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.
La. 1970), afJ'd on other grounds, 444 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1971), the court stated:
This rule [that notice is not mandated and the adequacy of representation is the sole
test] it seems to us, is lacking in fundamental fairness in that it gives absent mem-
bers of the class two bites at the apple at the expense of the defendant. For if a court
rules on the merits in favor of the [plaintiff] class, the absent members can reap
the benefits of such a decision. But if the court should rule against the class on the
merits, then, as we have hitherto noted, they can argue that they were not adequately
represented. This leaves a defendant to a Rule 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2) class action in a
most precarious position, and we simply cannot subscribe to a rule of law with such
unfair consequences.
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Notice in Defendant Class Actions
The issue now focuses upon the necessity of notice in (b)(1) and
(b)(2) class actions when a defendant class of public officials is
sought to be maintained. In those jurisdictions which have adopted
the Eisen rationale, the answer is obvious - personal notice is man-
datory in all defendant class actions.2"' The answer is not so clear
in those jurisdictions which maintain that notice is not constitution-
ally mandated and issue it only with discretion. Upon examination
of the functions which notice can provide in pursuing the goals of
maintaining a defendant class of public officials, it will be demon-
strated that notice must be required, irrespective of the constitu-
tional issues on which authorities have differed. An examination of
those functions follows.
1. Assure Adequate Representation
A class action may not be maintained unless the court is satis-
fied that the named party will adequately represent the class.2"7
Since inadequate representation is one of the chief grounds upon
which a class action judgment can be later collaterally attacked,""s
318 F. Supp. at 1353. See Snyder v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D.
Ill. 1968). In Richard v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the court stated that
without mandatory notice
[pilaintiffs would have all the benefits of Rule 23 without assuming any of the
burdens. It is not what the defendants insist on, but what the rule and due process
require. This cavalier treatment of the notice required by the rule is but another facet
of the inadequacy of representation.
272 F. Supp. at 156.
The following commentators have argued that notice is constitutionally mandated: Ward
& Elliott, The Contents and Mechanics of Rule 23 Notice, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 557,
560-61 (1969); Comment, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 COLUM.
L. REv. 818, 833-36 (1946); Comment, Can Due Process be Satisfied by Discretionary Notice
in Federal Class Actions, 4 CREIGHTON L. REv. 268, 300-02 (1971); Comment, Revised Federal
Rule 23, Class Actions: Surviving Difficulties and New Problems Require Further
Amendment, 52 MINN. L. REv. 509, 521-24 (1967).
216. Prejudgment notice in all class actions is apparently required in the second, sixth
and seventh circuits. See Schraeder v. Selective Serv. Sys. Loc. Bd. No. 76 of Wis., 470 F.2d
73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972); Zeilstra v. Tarr, 466 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1972);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 479 F.2d
1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
217. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
218. Sam Fox Publishing Co., Inc. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683,691 (1960); Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940). In Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973), the court
held that the absent members were not bound by a class judgment because their representa-
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courts want assurance that the named party is, in fact, an adequate
representative of the class. In the typical plaintiff class action, for
example, the defendant may have little interest in exposing an inad-
equate plaintiff representative; he may, at times, have a real incen-
tive in not doing So. 211 Notice to the members of the plaintiff class
has been frequently used to provide that added assurance to courts
that their finding is an accurate one. 0
This reasoning applies equally well, if not more, in the context
of a defendant class. A court cannot assume that a plaintiff will
designate a strong and resourceful adversary. A plaintiff neither
holds any personal incentive to do so, nor can one expect he would
do so out of considerations of fairness to the absent defendant mem-
bers. This places a particular burden upon the court to protect the
absent defendants. The easiest and probably the most efficient
method to obtain this protection, would be to order personal notice
to all members of the defendant class.
Issuance of notice to the defendant class also works to the
benefit of the plaintiffs who may be concerned with obtaining a
binding judgment. Should the absent members fail to object to the
adequacy of their representation in the suit, they may find it more
difficult to challenge collaterally the same issue in a later action.Y1
tion had been inadequate (the representative failed to appeal a decision adverse to the
interests of the plaintiff class). The court set forth a two-pronged test to determine whether
the class representative adequately represented the class so that the judgment in the class
suit would bind the absent members. The test includes:
(1) Did the trial court in the first suit correctly determine, initially, that the repre-
sentative would adequately represent the class? and
(2) Does it appear, after the termination of the suit, that the class representative
adequately protected the interests of the class?
474 F.2d at 72. See generally Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action
Judgments, 87 HAsv. L. REv. 589 (1974).
219. If the defendant believes that the representative plaintiff would inadequately rep-
resent the plaintiff class or is otherwise incompetent, it may be in defendant's interest not to
challenge plaintiff's motion for a class determination. Should defendant win on the merits,
all members of the plaintiff class will be bound. Although such a judgment is subject to
collateral attack (see note 218 supra), defendant would now place the burden of challenging
the inadequacy of representation on the absent members of the plaintiff class.
220. Harper v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1192 n.1 (D.
Md.), modified on other grounds, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973); Northern Natural Gas Co.
v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 636 (D. Kan. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1971).
221. While the right to challenge the adequacy of representation is always available to
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2. Allow for Intervention
Notice can also be utilized to allow absent members the oppor-
tunity to exercise their right of intervention. Intervention can satisfy
the absent members' opportunity to be heard should some members
of the class have a desire to appear personally and litigate the mat-
ter. Also, by broadening the representative base, it assures the court
that all claims and defenses will be brought out and fully litigated.
This would likewise be important to a defendant class, especially
when the validity of a statute is at issue. It becomes imperative that
all facts and theories be fully explored and weighed by a court before
a final determination be made on a matter of such serious import
and one which would have a statewide effect. Fundamental consid-
erations of fairness would demand no less.
3. Disseminate Knowledge
Notice also would make all members of the class aware of the
suit. This would be particularly applicable to a defendant class of
public officials. It has been repeatedly stated that one of the major
goals of such a class is to assure uniform statutory construction or
corresponding practice. Although it is the single suit which makes
this possible, implementation can only be effectuated by actual
knowledge of the suit to all members of the class. A court may
indeed have justifiable concern should plaintiff argue that notice
need not be given in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions when the same party
later exhorts that a defendant class should be maintained to obtain
the benefits of uniform treatment.
absent members of the class (since due process would be violated without it) (see note 218
supra), it is to the absentees' interests to object as early as possible. Since collateral attacks
arise only after the merits have been argued and decided, courts may be reluctant to reverse
a trial judge's determination that the representation was adequate. A liberalized allowance
for collateral attacks would effectively destroy one of the primary reasons for class actions:
efficient judicial administration through the elimination of repetitious litigation.
Also, the failure to intervene or at least object to the suit, may have serious ramifications
for absentees who may wish to appeal. For example, in Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co.,
425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970), the appellants, who were unnamed members of a defendant
class below, appealed from a consent judgment concerning patent validity and infringement.
The court of appeals summarily rejected their argument because appellants had not taken
even minimal steps to preserve their appeal. The court noted that although appellants had
both actual and constructive notice, they did not seek exclusion nor offer to intervene nor
object to the consent form. The court held that a right to appeal from an adverse judgment
exists only when the unnamed members of the class object to the dismissal or compromise.
1975] et al.: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23: A Defendant Class Action wit
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4. Ease in Enforcement
A related goal of bringing an action against a class of defend-
ants comprised of public officials is to make the process of enforce-
ment easier and to have a more powerful and meaningful weapon
against recalcitrant officials. By binding all officials to a single judg-
ment, there no longer is the need to relitigate constantly the merits
of the case against each official. Any failure to comply with such a
judgment could hopefully be met by a more simple contempt pro-
ceeding. However, before a contempt citation can issue, knowledge
of the previous judgment must be established. Only notice can ade-
quately provide this prerequisite .212
Personal notice should be mandatory for all defendant class
actions. 22 As demonstrated, notice so closely coincides with the
major goals of a defendant class that it would appear impossible to
establish such a class without it.24 Although the class of public
officials may be so numerous as to make any notice costly and
burdensome, 225 the fact that the class is easily identifiable suggests
222. Due process requires that a person cited for contempt have knowledge of the court
order, either actual or by service of process. United States ex rel. Carter v. Jennings, 333 F.
Supp. 1392 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
223. There is insufficient space to examine the difficulties in devising an adequate
system of notice. Several prefatory words are, however, in order. If notice is made equivalent
to service of process, the advantages of a defendant class action will be largely defeated. On
the other hand, the less formal the notice and the machinery to issue it become, the greater
chance that individual members of the defendant class will not receive it. This dilemma
forced Dean Chafee to state: "Yet there ought to be something-perhaps postcards, perhaps
an advertisement on the financial page of the New York Times." Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS
OF EQUrrY 231 (1950).
In Danforth v. Christian, 351 F. Supp. 287 (W.D. Mo. 1972), the court utilized an
interesting mechanism to issue notice to the respective plaintiff and defendant classes. The
court had the various parties issue a joint press release which was sent to the members of
the defendant class and to the news media for publication and broadcast.
224. But see Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720, 722 n.3 (D. Conn. 1973);
Pennsylvania Ass'n, Ret'd Child. v. Commonwealth of Pa., 343 F. Supp. 279, 291-92 (E.D.
Pa. 1972).
225. Neither Rule 23 nor the Advisory Committee Note specify who shall pay the cost
of notice. The generally accepted rule is that this cost should always be borne by the plaintiff.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2153 (1974). The underlying rationale for this
approach is that since the class action (either plaintiff or defendant) is a weapon for the
plaintiff, he should bear the cost as a burden of the litigation. Notice costs become another
prerequisite to maintenance of a class action. One court has also noted that plaintiff's refusal
to pay for notice reflected on the adequacy of his representation. Richard v. Cheatham, 272
F. Supp. 148, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1975], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol9/iss2/4
DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS
that the task is not insurmountable. Such a procedure not only
assures the court that the defendants' due process rights will be
protected, but it also guarantees the plaintiff class that the judg-
ment will be a final one not subject to a later reversal due to a lack
of due process.
CONCLUSION
The sanctions which are presently employed against public offi-
cials have not proved effective in securing their compliance to judi-
cial decisions which pertain to their authority and practices. The
sheer number of these officials and the fact that they are not directly
subject to a common authority have made effective and meaningful
enforcement of judgments against them difficult, if not impossible.
The procedural device of a defendant class is an ideal method to fill
gaps left by the existing set of remedies. Maintenance of a
defendant class facilitates efficient judicial administration by elimi-
nating repetitious and frequently needless litigation. More impor-
tantly, the defendant class action promotes the ends of justice by
providing the means for establishing a uniform construction of state
statutes. The expanded binding effect of amended Rule 23 also es-
tablishes statewide implementation of this statutory construction
by giving plaintiffs a meaningful enforcement mechanism against
recalcitrant officials.
The wording of Rule 23, however, is deficient in that it accom-
modates, preserves and even encourages the general tendency of
Counterbalancing this practice, is the argument that placing the expense of notice upon
plaintiffs would end possibly meritorious suits. This, it is argued, would frustrate the policy
behind amended Rule 23. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 269 (1971). In
other words, arbitrarily burdening plaintiff with* the costs of notice will often permit a de-
fendant to win by default since the plaintiff, even.though his case is strong, may be unable
to pay for the requisite notice.
Who should bear the cost of notice when a defendant class of public officials is sought to
be maintained has received very little attention. In Hadnott v. Amos, 295 F. Supp. 1003
(M.D. Ala. 1968), the costs were equally divided between plaintiffs and one of the named
defendants, the secretary of state. In Wilson v. Kelly, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968),
the court held that the costs should be taxed to the defendant class, "but the Court is of the
opinion that the state should pay such costs." Id. at 1013. This latter practice should be
preferred. It is the state and not the class of local officials who are the real party defendants
to the action. The state is in a far better position to pay for such costs, plus, the class action
provides important res judicata effects should the state win on the merits.
226. See notes 218 and 221 supra.
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courts and commentators to conceptualize class actions solely in
terms of plaintiff classes. As a result, the rule does not adequately
foster an appreciation for the distinctive characteristics of defend-
ant classes. The impotence of (b)(3), the impropriety of (b)(2), and
the vagueness surrounding the notice provisions and their correla-
tion to due process requirements all serve as prime examples of this
inadequacy.
It is unrealistic to anticipate an immediate revision of Rule 23
which would more definitively accommodate defendant classes.
Courts are therefore required to apply the rule to defendant classes
notwithstanding its present conceptual and practical difficulties.
Accordingly, attorneys seeking to reap the numerous benefits and
advantages inherent in maintaining a defendant class of public offi-
cials must thereby employ one of the troublesome (b) categories. To
avoid the most serious pitfalls, the formation of a defendant class
can be most satisfactorily based on (b)(1)(B) since an adjudication
concerning a certain statute or practice will be dispositive of the
defendant class' interests. In this manner, the advantages of a de-
fendant class can be secured without requiring the practitioner to
wait for Rule 23 to be further modified.
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